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INCOME INEQUALITY AND PAY RATIO
DISCLOSURE: A MORAL CRITIQUE OF SECTION
953(B)
Jim Staihar
Congress passed a pay ratio disclosure rule in 2010 as part of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act).  Under Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, a company is 
required to disclose the ratio of the annual total compensation of its CEO to 
the median of the annual total compensation of all its employees.1  In 2015, 
five years after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission issued its final implementation of Section 953(b) 
among considerable controversy about the justification of this pay ratio 
provision.2  Neither the text of Section 953(b) nor the legislative history 
surrounding its passage contains an explicit statement of any intended 
benefits of the rule.  In this article, I explore a broad range of moral reasons 
that might count against inequalities within a company’s pay schedule.  
The moral reasons I identify derive from the extensive literature on 
egalitarianism in moral and political philosophy.  The importance of these 
egalitarian reasons indicates that Congress had a strong justification for 
passing a pay ratio disclosure rule as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.  That 
said, I argue that Section 953(b) is ultimately unjustifiable and stands in 
need of revision because the relevant egalitarian reasons count in favor of 
an alternative pay ratio disclosure rule that is both more justifiable and 
readily available.  Congress should amend Section 953(b) accordingly. 
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 1.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §953(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 2.  Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 229, 240, 249). 
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INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation has been rising over the past few decades in 
publically traded companies3 in the United States.4  Moreover, executive 
compensation has been rising at a faster rate than the average pay of the 
U.S. worker.5  Accordingly, the gap between the pay of chief executive 
 3.  Throughout this article, I refer only to companies that are publically traded in the 
United States.  More precisely, I refer only to companies that are governed by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-78pp (2012)). 
 4.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE MISHEL & ALYSSA DAVIS, ECON. POLICY INST., ISSUE BRIEF
NO. 380, CEO PAY CONTINUES TO RISE AS TYPICAL WORKERS ARE PAID LESS 1-6 (2014), 
http://www.epi.org/files/2014/ceo-pay-continues-to-rise.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7BT-
3DWR] [hereinafter MISHEL & DAVIS, CEO PAY] (reporting the vast growth of CEO pay, 
especially when considered against typical workers); LAWRENCE MISHEL & ALYSSA DAVIS,
ECON. POLICY INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 399, TOP CEOS MAKE 300 TIMES MORE THAN
TYPICAL WORKERS 1-5 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/top-ceos-make-300-times-
more-than-typical-workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C8B-YMB6] [hereinafter MISHEL &
DAVIS, TOP CEOS] (same); Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive 
Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 283-95 (2005) (same); Carola Frydman & Dirk 
Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75, 77-80 (2010) (same); Carola 
Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term 
Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2106-07 (2010) (same); Thomas Piketty 
& Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International 
Perspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 204 (2006) (same). 
 5.  See, e.g., MISHEL & DAVIS, CEO PAY, supra note 4, at 6-7 (noting that the rate of 
pay for the typical worker has been growing at a marginal rate compared to CEO pay); 
MISHEL & DAVIS, TOP CEOS, supra note 4, at 5-6; (same); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel 
Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1, 31-33 (2003) 
(same); Jon Bakija et al., Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of 
Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data 1-2 (April 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at 
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officers (CEOs) and the pay of the average worker has also been 
increasing.  As the gap has increased, so has public concern over (a) the 
justification of current levels of executive compensation6 and (b) the effects 
of rising levels of income inequality in companies and in society more 
generally.7
Against the background of this public concern, Congress passed a pay 
ratio disclosure rule in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).8  According to Section 
953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, a company is required to disclose (a) the 
annual total compensation of its CEO,9 (b) the median of the annual total 
compensation of all its employees,10 and (c) the ratio of the two amounts.11
https://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6HK-4LNW]) (same); Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (July 1, 2015), CEO Pay Has Grown 90 Times Faster Than Typical Worker Pay Since 
1978, http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-has-grown-90-times-faster-than-typical-
worker-pay-since-1978 [https://perma.cc/A48U-4E8M] (same). 
 6.  See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-7 (2004) (proposing that executives 
do not truly produce an equivalent amount to the compensation they receive); GRAEF S.
CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 96-
100 (1992) (same); Jeffrey Moriarty, Do CEOs Get Paid Too Much?, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
257, 257 (2005) (arguing that CEOs are overpaid under three views of justice in wages). 
 7.  See generally, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2013) 
(describing the effects of growing inequality on the United States government and justice 
system). 
 8.  Dodd-Frank Act § 953(b) (2010). 
 9.  More precisely, Section 953(b) requires disclosure of the annual total compensation 
of “the chief executive officer (or any equivalent position)” of the company. Id. § 
953(b)(1)(B).  In its final implementation of Section 953(b), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) interprets this part of the rule to require disclosure of the annual total 
compensation of a company’s “principal executive officer” (PEO).  Executive 
Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(1)(ii) (2016). 
 10.  More specifically, Section 953(b) requires a company to disclose the median of the 
annual total compensation of all its employees, “except the chief executive officer (or any 
equivalent position)” of the company.  Dodd-Frank Act § 953(b)(1)(A) (2010).  The 
decision of Congress to exclude the CEO’s compensation from the calculation of the median 
compensation of all of a company’s employees is puzzling to anyone with an understanding 
of the statistical distinction between a “median” and an “average.”  Because executive 
compensation can be extraordinarily high, its exclusion could very well have a material 
effect on the calculation of the “average” compensation of a company’s employees.  But as 
just one employee’s compensation among many others, the exclusion of the CEO’s pay 
should not have a material effect on the calculation of the “median” compensation of a 
company’s employees.  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Dodd-Frank, Compensation Ratios, and 
the Expanding Role of Shareholders in the Governance Process, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 91, 94 n.19 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Brown-
Executive-Compensation-and-Shareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC58-BE9J] (noting that 
removing the CEO’s pay from the calculation of the median is not meaningful to the 
calculation).
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Thus, under Section 953(b), a company is required to disclose the ratio of 
the pay of its CEO to the pay of its median employee.12  In 2015, five years 
after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued its final implementation of Section 953(b) 
among considerable controversy about the justification of this pay ratio 
provision.13
The controversy over the passage and implementation of Section 
953(b) concerns both the expected costs and benefits of the rule.14  Two 
potential costs are noteworthy.  First, commentators worry that the rule will 
 11.   Section 953(b) requires companies to disclose this information in any filing 
described in 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a) (2016).  Dodd-Frank Act § 953(b)(1) (2010).  Companies 
must begin disclosing this information for their first fiscal year beginning on or after 
January 1, 2017.  Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) Instruction 7 to Item 
402(u) (2016) (Transition Periods for Registrants).  Section 953(b) also requires companies 
to determine the compensation of an employee in accordance with Summary Compensation 
Table, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(x) (2010), which was in effect the day before the Dodd-
Frank Act was enacted.  Dodd-Frank Act § 953(b)(2) (2010). 
 12.  By a company’s “median employee,” I refer to the employee whose annual total 
compensation represents the median of all the company’s employees.  In this article, unless 
noted otherwise, whenever I refer to an employee’s pay, I mean the employee’s annual total 
compensation.
 13.  The SEC Commissioners approved the implementation of the rule by a vote of 
three to two.  Jeff Drew, SEC Approves CEO Pay Ratio Rule, J. ACCT. (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2015/aug/ceo-pay-ratio-rule-201512774.html 
[https://perma.cc/L6NZ-ZXES] (noting that 287,400 comment letters, including 1500 
unique letters, were received on the proposed rule).  When the SEC approved the rule, SEC 
Chair Mary Jo White stated: “To say that the views on the pay ratio disclosure requirement 
are divided is an obvious understatement.  Since it was mandated by Congress, the pay ratio 
rule has been controversial, spurring a contentious and, at times, heated dialogue.”  Public 
Statement, Mary Jo White, SEC Chair, Statement at Open Meeting on Security-based Swap 
Rules Under Title VII and on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-at-open-meeting-on-sbs-and-pay-ratio-
disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/KV4J-6C3F].  
 14.  See, e.g., Public Statement, Michael S. Piwowar, SEC Commissioner, Dissenting 
Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-
disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/MH5P-X3WX] [hereinafter Piwowar, Dissenting]
(describing the rationale and arguments against requiring the disclosure of the ratio between 
the CEO’s pay and the median employee’s pay); Public Statement, Michael S. Piwowar, 
SEC Commissioner, Additional Dissenting Comments on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 7, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/additional-dissenting-statement-on-pay-ratio-
disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/AL8F-PMBH] [hereinafter Piwowar, Additional
Dissenting] (same); Public Statement, Daniel M. Gallagher, SEC Commissioner, Dissenting 
Statement at an Open Meeting to Adopt the “Pay Ratio” Rule, (Aug. 5, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-to-adopt-the-
pay-ratio-rule.html [https://perma.cc/JS7Q-SWJ6] (same); Recent Regulation, Pay Ratio 
Disclosure, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1144 (2016) (same).
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end up “shaming” CEOs and their companies.15  The worry seems to be that 
the pay gap between a company’s CEO and its median worker will appear 
unjustifiably large to the public, indicating excessive executive 
compensation.16  In response, the public will express its objection to the pay 
gap and the CEO’s level of compensation.  The CEO and others in the 
company will feel humiliated as a result. 
Second, in addition to the experiential costs of shame that CEOs and 
their companies could suffer personally, the compliance costs of Section 
953(b) are expected to be significant.17  Companies are already required to 
calculate and disclose the compensation of their CEOs.18  However, Section 
953(b) imposes on a company a new obligation to identify and disclose the 
compensation of its median employee.19  For a company without a 
consolidated payroll system, the costs of complying with this new 
disclosure obligation could be especially high.20  Initially, a company will 
need to identify the employee whose annual total compensation represents 
the median of the annual total compensation of all its employees.21  Then 
 15.  Peter Schroeder, Disputed Rule Intended to Shame CEOs, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/208161-disputed-rule-intended-to-shame-ceos 
[https://perma.cc/6D25-XX6P]; Piwowar, Dissenting, supra note 14; Piwowar, Additional
Dissenting, supra note 14; Gallagher, supra note 14. 
 16.  See infra text accompanying notes 110-12 (discussing the concept of excessive 
executive compensation). 
 17.  See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,154-62, 50,178-83 (Aug. 18, 
2015) (discussing the SEC’s estimates of the compliance costs of its implementation of 
Section 953(b)). 
 18.  See Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2016) (establishing what 
information must be disclosed concerning executive compensation and the manner in which 
to do so). 
 19.  Certain companies are exempt from Section 953(b).  These include smaller 
reporting companies, emerging growth companies, foreign private issuers, and U.S.-
Canadian Multijurisdictional Disclosure System filers.  Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 
50,104, 50,114-16 (Aug. 18, 2015); see also Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-106, § 102(a)(3), 126. Stat. 306, 309 (2012) (exempting emerging growth 
companies from the requirements of Section 953(b)); Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 
229.402(u) Instruction 8 to Item 402(u) (2016) (same).  The definition of “employee” under 
Section 953(b) does not include a company’s independent contractors or “leased” workers 
whose compensation is determined by an unaffiliated third party.  Executive Compensation, 
17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(3) (2016). 
 20.  See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,146 (Aug. 18, 2015) 
(acknowledging that registrants without a centralized, consolidated payroll system would 
incur increased costs associated with transitioning). 
 21.  The SEC’s final implementation of Section 953(b), though, does ease the burden of 
identifying a company’s median worker in several ways.  For example, to identify its 
median employee, a company is permitted to use statistical sampling techniques over its full 
employee population, and a company is granted flexibility in terms of the specific 
compensation measure used to identify its median employee. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) 
Instruction 4 to Item 402(u) (2016) (Methodology and Use of Estimates).  A company is 
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the company will need to determine the annual total compensation of its 
median employee, which could require calculating certain aspects of the 
employee’s compensation that are not usually quantified by a company for 
non-executive workers.22
Given the expected costs of Section 953(b), commentators skeptical of 
the rule doubt whether the required pay ratio disclosures would have any 
comparable value, especially to shareholders.23  Neither the text of Section 
953(b) nor the legislative history surrounding its passage contains an 
explicit statement of any intended benefits of the rule.24  In its 
implementation of the rule, the SEC speculates that Congress intended the 
pay ratio disclosures to provide information that investors could use 
somehow to evaluate the justification of a CEO’s compensation, that is, 
whether or not the CEO’s pay is excessive.25  Other commentators suggest 
that the value of pay ratio disclosures might be connected to the 
productivity of a company’s workers.26  These disclosures could provide 
investors with information about how well a company’s pay schedule is 
promoting productivity among its workforce. 
There are two competing ways in which pay gaps between employees 
within a company might affect their productivity.  On the one hand, 
differences in pay could motivate workers to increase their productivity, 
increasing either the quantity or quality of what they produce.27  In a 
required to identify its median worker only once every three years unless the company 
reasonably believes there has been a change that would significantly affect the disclosed pay 
ratio.  17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) Instruction 2 to Item 402(u) (2016).  In some cases, a 
company is even permitted to exclude up to 5% of its non-U.S. employees when identifying 
the median.  17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)(ii) (2016).  But although the SEC’s numerous 
accommodations reduce the costs of identifying a company’s median worker, the remaining 
costs will still be significant. 
 22.  See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,138-41 (Aug. 18, 2015) 
(outlining the calculation of annual total compensation and the discretion or flexibility given 
to registrants in this calculation).  Here too the SEC eased the burden of calculating the 
annual total compensation of a company’s median employee by permitting the use of 
estimates.  17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) Instruction 4 to Item 402(u) (2016) (Methodology and 
Use of Estimates). 
 23.  See, e.g., Piwowar, Dissenting, supra note 14; Piwowar, Additional Dissenting,
supra note 14; Gallagher, supra note 14. 
 24.  Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105 (Aug. 18, 2015). 
 25.  See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105-07 (Aug. 18, 2015). 
 26.  See, e.g., Public Statement, Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, The CEO Pay 
Ratio Rule: A Workable Solution for Both Issuers and Investors n.7 (Aug. 5, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html
[https://perma.cc/3PTE-UM8F] (proposing that the new requirement for disclosure will 
promote accountability for executive compensation). 
 27.  See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as 
Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981) (showing that compensation based 
on ordinal rank produces the same allocation of resources as a payment schedule based on 
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tournament model, positions within a company are organized along a 
hierarchy, and higher-ranking positions come with higher compensation.  
Lower-ranking employees can be motivated to increase their productivity 
as a means of improving their prospects of earning a promotion and higher 
compensation. 
On the other hand, pay gaps could have the opposite effect.  
Differences in pay can lead workers to decrease their productivity, 
decreasing the quantity or quality of what they produce.28  If differences in 
pay seem unjustifiably large, lower-paid employees could feel treated 
unfairly by their companies.29  So the lesser-paid employees can feel less 
motivated to produce for their companies for a variety of reasons.  For 
example, employees can feel less loyal and committed to companies that 
they perceive to be unjust to them. 
In this article, I go beyond these potential negative effects on 
employee productivity to explore a broader range of moral reasons that 
might count against inequalities within a company’s pay schedule.  The 
moral reasons I identify derive from the extensive literature on 
egalitarianism in moral and political philosophy.30  The importance of these 
output); Olubunmi Faleye et al., The Determinants and Effects of CEO-Employee Pay 
Ratios, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3258, 3258-59 (2013) (payment based on the outcome of 
sequential promotion tournaments allows ordinary employees to recognize opportunity in 
higher pay ratios). 
 28.  See, e.g., J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 283-88 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965) (arguing 
that when inequities are reduced, individual productivity increases and operating costs 
decrease); James A. Cotton, Toward Fairness in Compensation of Management and Labor: 
Compensation Ratios, A Proposal for Disclosure, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157, 180-81 (1997) 
(finding that oversized executive compensation packages undercut employee morale and 
productivity); Douglas M. Cowherd & David I. Levine, Product Quality and Pay Equity 
Between Lower-Level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive 
Justice, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 302 (1992) (finding that large gaps between the pay of higher 
echelon and lower echelon workers may lower product quality); cf. Jae Yong Shin et al., 
Determinants and Performance Effects of Executive Pay Multiples: Evidence from Korea,
68 ILR. REV. J. WORK & POL’Y 53, 73-75 (2015) (analyzing the effects of vertical pay 
disparity on employees in Korea). 
 29.  Cf. infra text accompanying notes 106-148 (discussing the relation between 
fairness and income inequalities). 
 30.  See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 
289 (1999) (dismissing “equality of fortune” as an egalitarian theory and defending 
“democratic equality” as integrating principles of distribution with the demands of respect); 
Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 81, 84-116 (Matthew 
Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (describing and comparing different egalitarian 
views); T. M. Scanlon, The Diversity of Objections to Inequality, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY
41, 57 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (outlining various reasons for 
pursuing greater equality and concluding that they play “a large part of the importance that 
equality has in our political thinking”); Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 5, 15-23 (2003) (criticizing luck egalitarianism as diverging from the more 
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egalitarian reasons indicates that Congress had a strong justification for 
passing a pay ratio disclosure rule as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.31  That 
said, I argue that Section 953(b) is ultimately unjustifiable and stands in 
need of revision because the relevant egalitarian reasons count in favor of 
an alternative pay ratio disclosure rule that is both more justifiable and 
readily available to Congress. 
Section 953(b) is an example of what I call a “max-median” pay ratio 
disclosure rule.  Under a max-median rule, a company is required to 
disclose:  (a) the compensation of its CEO; (b) the compensation of its 
median worker; and (c) the ratio of the two.32  In this article, I argue that a 
more justifiable alternative to Section 953(b) would be what I call a “max-
min” pay ratio disclosure rule.  Under a max-min rule, a company is 
required to disclose:  (a) the compensation of its CEO; (b) the 
compensation of its lowest-paid worker; and (c) the ratio of the two.33  In 
short, I argue that a max-min pay ratio disclosure rule is more justifiable 
than a max-median rule because the compensation of a company’s least 
paid worker has greater moral significance than the compensation of its 
median worker.34  Congress should amend Section 953(b) accordingly, 
converting it to a max-min pay ratio disclosure rule.35
familiar way of understanding equality); Larry S. Temkin, Inequality: A Complex, 
Individualistic, and Comparative Notion, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 327, 329-30 (2001). 
 31.  Although I argue there were strong reasons in favor of Congress’s passing a pay 
ratio disclosure rule, I do not presume that any member of Congress was actually aware of 
these reasons when it enacted Section 953(b) as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.  A law can be 
justified for reasons not appreciated by the lawmaker. 
 32.  On my terminology, I take “max-median” to be an abbreviation of “maximum-
median.”  Throughout this article, I presume the CEO of a company is the highest-paid 
employee of the firm.  Therefore, I assume the CEO’s pay represents the “maximum” 
compensation of any employee in the firm. 
 33.  On my terminology, I take “max-min” to be an abbreviation of “maximum-
minimum.”  The income of a company’s lowest-paid employee represents the “minimum” 
compensation of any employee in the firm. 
 34.  Cf. Thomas Nagel, Equality, in MORAL QUESTIONS 106, 118 (1979) (“[W]hat 
makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those whose overall life 
prospects put them at the bottom.”); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT
39-66 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (defending a theory of justice under which the “basic structure 
of society” should be organized to provide “the greatest benefit” to “the least-advantaged 
members of society”).  Although the life prospects of the worst-off members of society have 
special moral significance in theories of justice, such as John Rawls’s, the life prospects of 
the “median” member of society (or any other organization) have no special moral 
significance in any theory of justice defended in the literature on moral and political 
philosophy.
 35.  For two possible amendments to Section 953(b) worth considering, see infra text 
accompanying notes 204-206. 
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I. TWO TYPES OF EGALITARIANISM
Two general kinds of egalitarian reasons could count against pay gaps 
between a company’s workers:  intrinsic egalitarian reasons and 
instrumental egalitarian reasons.36  According to intrinsic egalitarianism, it 
is bad in itself if someone is worse off than others through no fault of her 
own.37  On this view, undeserved inequalities between people are 
intrinsically bad independently of whether such inequalities produce further 
bad effects.38  According to instrumental egalitarianism, it is bad if some 
people are worse off than others precisely because such inequalities would 
have bad further consequences.39
Given the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental 
egalitarianism, it is important to note that these views are not mutually 
exclusive.  An egalitarian could endorse both views.  That is, an egalitarian 
might object to inequalities on the basis of both sorts of reasons.  An 
inequality might be objectionable both because it is intrinsically bad and 
because it results in bad further effects. 
In the next section, I focus on the intrinsic egalitarian reasons that 
might count against inequalities within a company’s pay schedule.  In the 
section following the next, I discuss the instrumental egalitarian reasons.  I 
argue that considerations of both intrinsic and instrumental egalitarianism 
support the adoption of a pay ratio disclosure rule, and both sorts of reasons 
favor a max-min rule over a max-median rule, such as Section 953(b). 
II. INTRINSIC EGALITARIANISM
A. An Argument 
Assume some workers in a company are paid less than others in the 
company through no fault of their own.  Then intrinsic egalitarians might 
contend that those income inequalities are bad in themselves.  That is, those 
 36.  See, e.g., Temkin, supra note 30, at 331-32 (drawing a similar distinction between 
“instrumental egalitarianism” and “non-instrumental egalitarianism”). 
 37.  See, e.g., Parfit, supra note 30, at 84, 122 n.8 (referring to intrinsic egalitarianism 
as “telic” egalitarianism); Temkin, supra note 30, at 333-34 (illustrating the relationship 
between the concern for equality and the concern for fairness). 
 38.  See Parfit, supra note 30, at 86 (arguing that there is a practical difference between 
thinking inequality is bad in itself and thinking it is bad because it has bad effects). 
 39.  See, e.g., Parfit, supra note 30, at 86 (explaining the difference between the 
instrumental value of equality and the intrinsic value of equality); Temkin, supra note 30, at 
331-32 (offering a distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental egalitarianism); 
cf. Martin O’Neill, What Should Egalitarians Believe?, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 119, 121 
(2008) (referring to “non-intrinsic egalitarianism”). 
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differences in pay could be intrinsically bad independent of whether they 
result in any bad further effects, such as decreasing the motivation of 
employees to be productive.40  If inequalities within a company’s pay 
schedule are intrinsically bad, then the company has a moral reason to 
mitigate those inequalities.41
Stakeholders42 who are socially responsible also have reason to learn 
the extent of the pay differences between a company’s employees on the 
assumption that those differences in pay could be bad in themselves.43
These stakeholders can include, among others, socially conscious investors, 
 40.  Not all intrinsic egalitarians are committed to the claim that income inequalities are 
intrinsically bad.  Intrinsic egalitarians can hold different views about the relevant measure 
for determining whether one person is worse off than another in the sense that would make 
the inequality intrinsically bad.  Intrinsic egalitarians who do take income inequalities to be 
intrinsically bad could take the relevant measure to be material resources or advantages. Cf.
G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 907 (1989) (defending 
an ideal of “equal access to advantage” (emphasis in original)); Ronald Dworkin, What is 
Equality?  Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 340-45 (1981) 
(defining an ideal of equality of resources) [hereinafter Dworkin, Equality of Resources].
Intrinsic egalitarians who do not regard income inequalities as bad in themselves might take 
the relevant measure to consist in, for example, welfare, opportunities for welfare, or 
capabilities. Cf. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 4 (1992) (defending an ideal of 
equality of “capability to achieve functionings”); Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal 
Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 88-90 (1989) (defending an ideal of equality of 
opportunity for welfare); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare,
10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 191-220 (1981) (discussing, albeit critically, claims of equality of 
welfare).  Even if income inequalities are not themselves intrinsically bad, there could still 
be intrinsic egalitarian reasons to object to income inequalities insofar as they result in other 
sorts of inequalities that are intrinsically bad, such as inequalities of welfare, opportunities 
for welfare, or capabilities. 
 41.  It is important to note that moral reasons of an egalitarian nature are not necessarily 
overriding:  they may compete with countervailing reasons to promote other moral ideals, 
such as efficiency.  So even if egalitarian considerations provide a company with a reason to 
flatten its pay schedule, the company could still be, all things considered, justified in 
maintaining significant pay differences between its employees.  For example, at some point, 
an egalitarian reason to minimize income inequalities between workers could be outweighed 
by a reason of efficiency to maintain pay differences as a means to providing workers with 
appropriate incentives to be productive.  In short, at some point, a gain in equality might be 
outweighed by a loss in efficiency. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 40, at 138-40 (discussing the 
“incentive” argument in favor of inequality); supra text accompanying note 27. 
 42.  See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH 31-81 (1984) (discussing the concept of stakeholders and the role of stakeholders 
in the governance of a company); Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder 
Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
65, 66-88 (1995) (examining aspects of the stakeholder theory). 
 43.  Once again, the reason to learn the extent of inequality within a company’s pay 
schedule is not necessarily decisive. Cf. supra note 41.  This reason can compete with other 
reasons to promote other moral ideals, such as minimizing costs.  At some point, the 
informational value of pay ratio disclosures might be outweighed by the compliance costs of 
these disclosures. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 15-20. 
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consumers, and employees who are committed to supporting ethical 
companies and helping companies in general improve their corporate social 
performance.44  Thus, the possibility that pay gaps between a company’s 
workers could be intrinsically bad can count in favor of requiring 
companies to comply with a pay ratio disclosure rule.  The pay ratios 
disclosed might provide socially responsible stakeholders with information 
about the extent to which inequalities within a company’s pay schedule are 
intrinsically bad and in need of mitigation. 
In light of the case for a pay ratio disclosure rule on the basis of 
intrinsic egalitarianism, we can see that there are at least three reasons why 
intrinsic egalitarians should also favor a max-min pay ratio disclosure rule 
over a max-median rule like Section 953(b).  First, on any plausible 
measure of evaluating the overall badness of the overall inequality in a 
distribution of goods, such as income, the gap between the best-off and 
worst-off individuals matters more than the gap between the best-off 
individual and the median individual.45  Other things being equal, the 
worst-off individual has the strongest moral claim against inequality.46  So, 
other things being equal, improving the lot of the worst-off individual by a 
certain amount would make the overall inequality in a distribution of goods 
 44.  Here I presuppose that companies and their investors can have a legitimate interest 
in promoting not only the objective of maximizing profits, but also other moral objectives as 
well.  See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for 
Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 787-92 (2007) (discussing 
the expressed aims of corporations themselves to be socially responsible); Jeanne M. 
Logsdon & Harry J. Van Buren III, Justice and Large Corporations: What Do Activist 
Shareholders Want?, 47 BUS. & SOC’Y 523, 527-29 (2008) (discussing issues of social 
justice advocated by activist shareholders); BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 2016 1, 25-27 (2016), 
https://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Principles-of-Corporate-Governance-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S3H-HADH] (recognizing that corporations have obligations to 
stakeholders other than shareholders).  Even a strong proponent of the profit motive, such as 
Milton Friedman, acknowledges that investors, who are the owners of companies, typically 
have an interest in constraining their companies’ objective to maximize profits by at least 
some ethical concerns.  Friedman writes:   
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an 
employee of the owners of the business.  He has direct responsibility to his 
employers.  That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with 
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and 
those embodied in ethical custom. 
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, in
CORPORATE ETHICS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 173, 173-74 (Walther Ch. Zimmerli et 
al. eds., 2007) (emphasis added). 
 45.  See, e.g., Larry S. Temkin, Inequality, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 99, 102-06 (1986) 
(focusing on the “complaints” of particular individuals through the lens of inequality). 
 46.  See id. at 341-42.
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better than improving the lot of anyone else, including the median 
individual, by the same amount.  Conversely, harming the worst-off by a 
certain amount would make the overall inequality worse than harming 
anyone else, including the median individual, by the same amount. 
Consequently, the information conveyed under a max-min pay ratio 
disclosure rule has greater moral significance than the information 
conveyed under a max-median rule.  Reducing the gap between the 
highest- and lowest-paid workers in a company should take priority over 
reducing the gap between the highest-paid worker and the median worker.  
So socially responsible stakeholders have more reason to learn the pay ratio 
disclosed under a max-min rule than the pay ratio disclosed under a max-
median rule.47
Second, if inequalities within a company’s pay schedule are generally 
regarded as intrinsically bad (or objectionable for some other reason), then 
under a pay ratio disclosure rule companies will face public pressure to 
minimize the pay ratio disclosed.48  Under a max-median rule, like Section 
953(b), a company can reduce the disclosed pay ratio by redistributing 
compensation from workers below the median to workers at the median.49
In other words, a company can minimize the pay ratio disclosed under a 
max-median rule by transferring compensation from its lowest-paid 
workers to its higher-paid workers at the median.  Thus, a max-median rule 
provides a company with a perverse incentive to redistribute compensation 
 47.  To clarify, this is a comparative claim.  I do not deny that there is an egalitarian 
reason to learn the pay gap between a company’s median worker and its highest-paid 
worker.  I only contend that there is a stronger, more urgent egalitarian reason to learn the 
pay difference between a company’s highest-paid and least-paid employees. 
 48.  In the future, companies could face a more direct financial incentive to lower the 
pay ratio disclosed under a rule, such as Section 953(b).  For example, in 2016 the city of 
Portland, Oregon voted to raise the business-income tax rate on companies whose CEOs 
earn more than 100 times the pay of their median employees.  Gretchen Morgenson, 
Portland Adopts Surcharge on C.E.O. Pay in Move vs. Income Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/business/economy/portland-oregon-tax-
executive-pay.html [https://perma.cc/5B8N-Q52Y].  In 2014, the California state legislature 
considered, but ultimately rejected, a bill that would reduce a company’s tax rate if the ratio 
between its CEO’s pay and the pay of its median worker were sufficiently low.  Gary Cohn, 
Overcompensation: Tying Corporate Taxes to CEO Pay, CAPITAL & MAIN (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://capitalandmain.com/features/california-expose/overcompensation-tying-corporate-
taxes-to-ceo-pay/ [https://perma.cc/M84G-DRLY]; Harold Meyerson, California’s Bid to 
Tax CEOs Who Don’t Share the Wealth, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/harold-meyerson-californias-bid-to-tax-ceos-
who-dont-share-the-wealth/2014/04/30/fc08619c-d07e-11e3-a6b1-45c4dffb85a6_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/AE5V-HEE6].  
 49.  Huan Lou, Comment Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule 20 (Dec. 2, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-518.pdf [https://perma.cc/93CX-3N23]; 
Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,162 (Aug. 15, 2015). 
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from its lower-paid workers to its higher-paid workers.  Under no sensible 
conception of intrinsic egalitarianism would such regressive transfers of 
income improve the overall inequality in a company’s pay schedule.50  On 
the contrary, regressive transfers of pay would make the overall inequality 
worse. 
Unlike a max-median pay ratio disclosure rule, a max-min rule would 
not provide a company with perverse incentives to make regressive 
transfers of compensation across employees.  To reduce the pay ratio 
disclosed under a max-min rule through a redistribution of pay across a 
company’s workers, the company must transfer compensation from its 
higher-paid workers to its lower-paid workers.  That is precisely what is 
demanded by any sensible conception of intrinsic egalitarianism. 
Third, the administrative costs of complying with a max-min pay ratio 
disclosure rule should be lower than the costs of complying with a max-
median rule.  The data collection and analysis required to determine the 
least-paid worker in a company should be simpler than what is required to 
determine the median worker.  To determine the median worker in a 
company with several operating segments, the company must consolidate, 
in a single ranking, compensation data on all its employees (or a 
sufficiently large sample of all its employees) across all of its operating 
segments.  But to determine its lowest-paid worker, the company need only 
consolidate, in a single ranking, compensation data on the lowest-paid 
employee of each of its operating segments.  Relative to a max-median 
rule, a max-min rule not only provides a better measure for evaluating the 
intrinsic badness of the inequality in a company’s pay schedule, but also 
does so at a lower compliance cost to companies.51
 50.  See, e.g., LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 320-21 (1993) (discussing the Pigou-
Dalton principle for individual transfers); Hugh Dalton, The Measurement of the Inequality 
of Incomes, 30 ECON. J. 348, 351-52 (1920) (illustrating the “principle of transfers”); see
SEN, supra note 40, at 24 (same).  To clarify, a max-median pay ratio disclosure rule would 
not provide companies with exclusively perverse incentives to make only regressive 
transfers of pay.  Under a max-median rule, a company would also have an incentive to 
transfer income from its CEO to its median employee.  Nevertheless, there would remain a 
perverse incentive to make regressive transfers to the median employee from those who are 
paid less. 
 51.  At this point, I should note that in addition to simple max-median and max-min pay 
ratios, there are alternative, more complex ways of measuring the inequality within a 
company’s pay schedule. See, e.g., Filipe Morais & Nada K. Kakabadse, The Corporate 
Gini Index (CGI) Determinants and Advantages: Lessons from a Multinational Retail 
Company Case Study, 11 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 380, 380 (2014) (discussing 
the Corporate Gini Index as a measure of a corporation’s pay inequality).  See generally
TEMKIN, supra note 50 (providing an exhaustive analysis of alternative ways of evaluating 
the inequality in a distribution of goods).  For two reasons, though, I do not consider the 
relative merits of alternative, more complex pay ratio disclosure rules in this article.  First, 
the compliance costs of such alternative rules would likely be higher because their data 
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B. Critical Analysis 
1. The Levelling Down Objection 
Critics might object to any attempt to defend a pay ratio disclosure 
rule based on intrinsic egalitarianism.  Critics could object to the very 
premise of intrinsic egalitarianism.  They might argue that an inequality of 
any kind, including income inequality, is never bad in itself.52  To see why, 
consider a company with two types of workers:  white-collar and blue-
collar.  The white-collar workers earn a higher salary than the blue-collar 
workers, creating an inequality within the company’s pay schedule.  Now 
suppose the managers of the company reduce the salary of the white-collar 
employees to the level of the blue-collar employees.  But rather than 
redistributing pay from the former to the latter, the managers simply 
destroy the money previously intended to provide the white-collar workers 
with a higher salary. 
If income inequality were intrinsically bad, then there would be 
something good about merely reducing the salary of the white-collar 
employees to the level of the blue-collar employees even if no one were to 
benefit from the reduction in any way.  Such a reduction would, after all, 
eliminate an inequality.  But contrary to the premise of intrinsic 
egalitarianism, critics might contend that there would be nothing good 
about merely harming some under conditions in which no one else benefits.  
Therefore, no form of inequality, including income inequality, is 
intrinsically bad. 
In response to critics, this levelling down objection does provide a 
strong reason to doubt that an inequality of any kind is ever bad in itself.  
Because of this, any defense of a pay ratio disclosure rule based on intrinsic 
egalitarianism must remain controversial.  Nevertheless, the levelling down 
objection is not necessarily decisive, and intrinsic egalitarians have some 
resources to defend themselves.53  Consider again the purported 
counterexample to intrinsic egalitarianism.  Intrinsic egalitarians are 
committed to the claim that there would be something good about merely 
lowering the salary of the white-collar workers to the level of the blue-
collection and analysis requirements would likely be more demanding.  Second, more 
complex measures of a company’s pay inequality would likely be less intuitive to ordinary 
users of a company’s financial disclosures.  Such measures would presuppose a more 
sophisticated background in statistical analysis.  The conceptual simplicity of a max-min 
pay ratio disclosure rule is an added virtue.   
 52.  The following challenge to intrinsic egalitarianism is an example of the “Levelling 
Down Objection.”  Parfit, supra note 30, at 98-99. 
 53.  See id. at 110-15 (detailing responses to the levelling down objection that are 
available to intrinsic egalitarians). 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 119 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 119 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
6_STAIHAR-TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/17 4:02 PM
2017] INCOME INEQUALITY AND PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE 471 
collar workers.  Such a reduction would eliminate an inequality between 
these employees. 
Intrinsic egalitarians, though, are not committed to the stronger, more 
objectionable claim that a brute reduction in the pay of white-collar 
workers would be all things considered justified.54  No sensible egalitarian 
regards equality as the only thing of intrinsic value.  Intrinsic egalitarians 
can adopt a pluralistic conception of value, which assigns intrinsic value to 
more than just equality.55  For example, intrinsic egalitarians can also 
regard utility as being intrinsically valuable.56  On the basis of a pluralistic 
conception of value, intrinsic egalitarians can contend that the loss in utility 
from merely reducing the salary of white-collar workers to the level of 
blue-collar workers would outweigh the gain in equality.  Therefore, such a 
brute reduction in the pay of white-collar employees would not be all 
things considered justified even though it would bring about more equality 
between employees.  By adopting a pluralistic conception of value and 
distinguishing all things considered judgments of value from value 
judgments focused only on equality, intrinsic egalitarians can sensibly 
object to the mere levelling down of anyone’s benefits, including income.57
In this way, intrinsic egalitarians can mitigate the force of the levelling 
down objection. 
2. The Fundamental Unit of Concern 
Even if pay differences between workers can be intrinsically bad, 
critics might still doubt the case for a pay ratio disclosure rule, whether a 
max-min rule or a max-median rule, on the basis of intrinsic egalitarianism.  
Critics could endorse a diachronic conception of intrinsic egalitarianism 
such that the fundamental unit of egalitarian concern is a person’s life 
considered as a whole.58  Under a diachronic conception, what is 
intrinsically bad is if some person’s life considered as a whole is worse 
than another person’s life considered as a whole.  Under a diachronic 
 54.  See id. at 111-12 (distinguishing “Strong Egalitarians,” who would consider a brute 
reduction justified, from “Moderates,” who would balance gains in equality against losses in 
other values). 
 55.  See, e.g., id. at 85, 99 (defining a “pluralist egalitarian view” in which it would be 
better to have both more equality and more utility); Temkin, supra note 30, at 336 
(distinguishing between monistic egalitarians and egalitarians who hold a pluralistic 
conception of value). 
 56.  Parfit, supra note 30, at 84-85. 
 57.  Id. at 110-15. 
 58.  Nagel, supra note 34, at 120; Temkin, supra note 30, at 328, 340, 349-50; Dennis 
McKerlie, Equality and Time, 99 ETHICS 475, 475-76 (1989) (describing the “complete lives 
view” of the fundamental egalitarian concern). 
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conception of intrinsic egalitarianism, pay differences between employees 
are not necessarily bad in themselves. 
To illustrate, suppose a company compensates its workers on the basis 
of seniority.  More senior employees earn more than those less senior, and 
more senior employees tend to be older than those less senior.  Under a 
diachronic conception of intrinsic egalitarianism, the fact that more senior 
workers are paid more than those less senior in the company does not 
necessarily generate an income inequality that is intrinsically bad.  The 
company could still compensate all its employees equally over the entire 
course of their careers. 
In response to critics, there are at least two reasons why a diachronic 
conception of intrinsic egalitarianism is consistent with support for a pay 
ratio disclosure rule on intrinsic egalitarian grounds.  First, a diachronic 
conception of intrinsic egalitarianism is consistent with a synchronic 
conception.  Under a synchronic conception, it is bad in itself if one person 
is worse off than another person considered at a specific time.59  An 
intrinsic egalitarian could endorse both a diachronic conception and a 
synchronic conception of the fundamental unit of egalitarian concern.60
According to such a hybrid view, an inequality between persons considered 
at a specific time could be intrinsically bad, and an inequality between the 
lives of persons considered as a whole could also be intrinsically bad. 
Consider income inequalities between the workers of a company.  An 
intrinsic egalitarian might contend that it would be bad in itself if some 
employees earn less than others over the entire course of their careers.  But 
even if these workers earn the same over their careers considered as a 
whole, there might still be something intrinsically bad if some of the 
workers earn less than others at specific times.  According to the hybrid 
egalitarian ideal under consideration, it would be best if there were no 
income inequalities between employees considering their careers as a 
whole or at specific times. 
Second, not every company can justify the pay gaps between its 
employees on the basis of a diachronic conception of intrinsic 
egalitarianism.  Not every company compensates its employees on the basis 
of seniority or otherwise ensures that its workers earn the same over the 
course of their entire careers.  Furthermore, a pay ratio disclosure rule need 
not unduly prejudice companies that do ensure this.  Any sensible rule will 
permit companies to disclose voluntarily a separate narrative discussion of 
 59.  See McKerlie, supra note 58, at 481 (describing the “simultaneous segments view” 
of the fundamental egalitarian concern); Temkin, supra note 30, at 349-50 (considering an 
egalitarian view that focuses on simultaneous or corresponding segments of individuals’ 
lives).
 60.  McKerlie, supra note 58, at 491; Temkin, supra note 30, at 349-50. 
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any considerations that justify the pay ratio disclosed under the rule.61
3. Personal Responsibility 
On a standard formulation of intrinsic egalitarianism, only undeserved 
inequalities are intrinsically bad.62  On this view, what is bad in itself is one 
person’s being worse off than another through no fault of his own.63
Insofar as someone is worse off than others as a result of choices for which 
he is personally responsible, this inequality need not be bad in itself.64
Critics might object to an intrinsic egalitarian defense of a pay ratio 
disclosure rule on the grounds that pay differences between employees can 
be deserved. 
More specifically, some workers might receive less pay than other 
workers as a result of choices for which the lower-paid are personally 
responsible.  Perhaps lower-paid employees freely chose to accept a lower-
paid position over a higher-paid one.  Maybe the lower-paid position 
involved less difficult work.  Or perhaps lower-paid employees freely 
chose not to develop the skills necessary to qualify for higher-paying jobs 
that add more value to their companies.  Whatever the reason, income 
inequalities that result from choices for which the lower-paid are personally 
responsible need not be intrinsically bad.  So intrinsic egalitarianism 
provides no reason to require companies to disclose those income 
inequalities, which are deserved.65
In response to critics, intrinsic egalitarians can concede that not all 
income inequalities are bad in themselves.  In some cases, the lower-paid 
earn less than others as a result of their own fault.  But it is implausible to 
suggest that all inequalities within every company’s pay schedule are 
deserved.66  Insofar as pay differences between employees might not be 
deserved, intrinsic egalitarianism provides one reason to favor adopting a 
pay ratio disclosure rule.  And once again, such a rule need not unduly 
 61.  In its final implementation of Section 953(b), the SEC sensibly permits companies 
to make such additional narrative disclosures at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) Instruction 9 to Item 
402(u) (2016). 
 62.  Temkin, supra note 30, at 334-35; Temkin, supra note 45, at 101 n.3. 
 63.  Temkin, supra note 30, at 334-35; Temkin, supra note 45, at 101 n.3; Parfit, supra
note 30, at 84, 122 n.8. 
 64.  Cf. Arneson, supra note 40, at 88 (“[I]t is morally fitting to hold individuals 
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their voluntary choices”); Dworkin, 
Equality of Resources, supra note 40, at 311 (contending that different choices can result in 
inequalities that are not necessarily objectionable). 
 65.  See infra text accompanying notes 166-193 (discussing the possibility that an 
employee’s income might be deserved or underserved). 
 66.  See Moriarty, supra note 6, at 267 (“The desert view of justice in wages condemns 
the current disparity between CEO and employee pay.”). 
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prejudice companies that do ensure that their lower-paid employees earn 
less than other employees only when they are personally responsible for 
earning less.  Insofar as a company can justify a disclosed pay ratio on the 
basis of the personal responsibility of its employees, the company should 
be free to disclose voluntarily a separate narrative discussion of this 
justification under any pay ratio provision. 
III. INSTRUMENTAL EGALITARIANISM
A theory of intrinsic egalitarianism can provide some support for a 
pay ratio disclosure rule.  Moreover, considerations of intrinsic 
egalitarianism also favor the adoption of a max-min pay ratio disclosure 
rule over a max-median rule, such as Section 953(b).  Any intrinsic 
egalitarian argument, though, must remain controversial, especially in light 
of the levelling down objection. 
In this section, I discuss some less controversial instrumental 
egalitarian reasons that favor the adoption of a pay ratio disclosure rule.67
These are reasons to object to pay differences between employees not 
because those income inequalities are intrinsically bad, but because they 
risk having bad further consequences.68  I show that considerations of 
instrumental egalitarianism also favor the adoption of a max-min pay ratio 
disclosure rule over a max-median rule.  Thus, the instrumental egalitarian 
arguments I defend in this section are also a call for Congress to amend 
Section 953(b) accordingly. 
A. Welfare 
Inequalities within a company’s pay schedule could be objectionable 
on grounds of the welfare69 of the company’s employees.70  Higher-paid 
 67.  My identification of the relevant instrumental egalitarian reasons is especially 
indebted to Scanlon, supra note 30. 
 68.  Like the reasons of intrinsic egalitarianism discussed earlier, the reasons of 
instrumental egalitarianism that I discuss below are not necessarily overriding.  All 
egalitarian reasons may compete with countervailing reasons to promote other moral ideals.  
See generally supra notes 41, 43. 
 69.  I remain neutral on the contentious issue of what a person’s welfare or, in other 
words, well-being consists in.  Competing conceptions of well-being might take it to consist 
in, among other things, the realization of certain mental states, the satisfaction of certain 
desires, or the obtaining of certain objective goods.  For an extended discussion of the 
concept of well-being, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND
MORAL IMPORTANCE 7-72 (1986).  For a more succinct discussion, see SHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 29-41 (1998). 
 70.  Cf. Scanlon, supra note 30, at 42-43 (describing a “humanitarian concern” to 
eliminate inequalities). 
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workers might use their additional compensation to attain higher levels of 
well-being than lower-paid workers.  For example, higher levels of income 
can be used to obtain a more nutritious diet or better housing, which would 
directly improve the quality of one’s life.  By redistributing compensation 
from higher-paid to lower-paid employees, a company might improve the 
welfare of the lower-paid employees without sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance in the lives of the higher-paid employees.71
Three general reasons grounded in the well-being of a company’s workers 
could count in favor of such progressive redistributions of pay.  Each 
reason not only supports the adoption of a pay ratio disclosure rule in 
general, but also counts in favor of a max-min rule over a max-median rule, 
like Section 953(b). 
1. Poverty
The major institutions in a society, including companies, might have a 
moral duty to help ensure that no member of the society or its institutions 
has a standard of living that falls below some minimally acceptable level.72
Provisionally, we can think of this level in terms of the poverty line.73  If a 
company’s pay schedule contains large inequalities, those pay differences 
could be objectionable if the company’s lower-paid employees are living in 
poverty.  More precisely, the company might be paying its lower-paid 
workers a wage that is below what is required to live above the poverty 
line.
The company could also be in a position to help lift its lower-paid 
employees out of poverty by transferring income to them from its higher-
paid employees.  If that is the case, the company might have a moral duty 
 71.  Cf. id. at 42 (“If some people are living under terrible conditions, while others are 
very well off indeed, then a transfer of resources from the better to the worse off, if it can be 
accomplished without other bad effects, is desirable as a way of alleviating suffering 
without creating new hardships of comparable severity.”); Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, 
and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972) (“If it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”). 
 72.  See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 283 (2004) (“[A] minimally just and decent society would provide all its citizens with 
a minimum threshold amount of certain key opportunities or ‘capabilities’”).  Cf. Scanlon, 
supra note 30, at 42-43, 46 (describing a humanitarian reason to benefit “those who are . . . 
living under conditions which we regard as seriously deficient” and to “relieve suffering or 
severe deprivation”).  
 73.  See Ronald Dworkin, Why Liberals Should Care about Equality, in A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 205, 208 (1985) (“It is, I think, apparent that the United States falls far short now 
[of the ideal of equality of resources].  A substantial minority of Americans . . . earn wages 
below any realistic ‘poverty line’”). 
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to flatten its pay schedule accordingly to minimize the extent to which its 
employees live in poverty.  A pay ratio disclosure rule could be justified as 
a means of providing socially responsible stakeholders with information 
about whether any of a company’s workers are living below the poverty 
line and, if so, the extent to which the company is in a position to improve 
the quality of their lives. 
Critics might object, though, that a pay ratio disclosure rule cannot be 
defended on the basis of the possibility that U.S. workers are living in 
poverty.  The U.S. has in place various safeguards providing a social safety 
net for U.S. citizens.  For example, there are federal and state minimum 
wage laws.74  Social welfare programs also provide benefits to both 
employed and unemployed U.S. citizens living under conditions of 
hardship.75  Because there is a social safety net for U.S. citizens, U.S. 
companies need not concern themselves with the possibility that any of 
their workers are living below the poverty line. 
In response to these critics, there are at least two reasons why the 
possibility of poverty is still relevant to U.S. companies.  First, some might 
reasonably doubt the sufficiency of the social safety net provided to U.S. 
citizens.  They could reasonably doubt whether the labor laws and social 
welfare programs in the U.S. go far enough to help U.S. citizens rise above 
the poverty line.76  Second, not all employees of U.S. companies are U.S. 
citizens or living in the United States.77  Some U.S. companies are 
 74.  See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm [https://perma.cc/VGT8-SVL8] 
(last updated Aug. 1, 2016) (documenting the minimum wage in each state for 2016). 
 75.  Cf. IRWIN GARFINKEL ET AL., WEALTH AND WELFARE STATES: IS AMERICA A
LAGGARD OR LEADER? (2010) (analyzing U.S. social welfare programs in relation to those 
of other developed nations and arguing that social welfare programs in the U.S. are quite 
large).
 76.  Cf. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014 12 (2015), 
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W42S-DWWQ] (noting that in 2014, the official poverty rate in the U.S. 
was 14.8 percent). 
 77.  Under Section 953(b), a company is required to include employees located in 
jurisdictions outside the U.S. when determining the pay of its median employee.  However, 
in its final implementation of Section 953(b), the SEC created two exceptions permitting 
companies to exclude some non-U.S. employees when making this determination.  First, 
companies may exclude non-U.S. employees living in foreign jurisdictions with data 
privacy laws that prevent companies from accessing the compensation information 
necessary to calculate the pay ratio required under Section 953(b).  See Pay Ratio 
Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)(i)(2016) (documenting this privacy-based exception 
to Section 953(b)).  Second, under a “de minimis” exemption, companies are permitted to 
exclude up to five percent of their non-U.S. employees under certain circumstances. Id. § 
229.402(u)(4)(ii).  I leave it an open question whether this de minimis exemption is a 
justifiable part of the SEC’s final implementation of Section 953(b).  However, under a 
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multinational with operations abroad.  These multinational U.S. companies 
could employ workers in less-developed countries that lack the kind of 
social safety net provided to U.S. citizens.78  Such U.S. companies could 
then have a moral duty to compensate their employees abroad above what 
is legally required to lift them out of poverty.79
Assuming a pay ratio disclosure rule can be justified on the basis of 
the possibility that a company’s workers are living below the poverty line, 
it is apparent that this justification also counts in favor of a max-min rule 
over a max-median rule.  The compensation of a company’s median worker 
is not a reliable indicator of whether any of the company’s employees are 
being paid below what is required to live above the poverty line.  The 
compensation of a company’s median worker might be quite high even 
though the wages of its lower-paid employees force them to live in squalor.  
A better indication of the extent to which a company’s workers could be 
living in poverty is the compensation of the company’s least-paid 
employee. 
In addition, insofar as companies would face public pressure to 
minimize a disclosed pay ratio, a max-median pay ratio disclosure rule 
would provide a company with a perverse incentive to lower the 
compensation of those employees most at risk of living below the poverty 
line.  As we have noted, under a max-median rule, a company could lower 
the disclosed pay ratio by redistributing income from its lowest-paid 
workers to its higher-paid median worker.80  Under a max-min rule, a 
company would have the right incentive to give priority to increasing the 
compensation of its employees who are most at risk of living in poverty. 
2. The Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income 
The diminishing marginal utility of income could also count against 
max-min pay ratio disclosure rule, such a de minimis exemption would be gratuitous:  a 
company’s least-paid employee might be living in a jurisdiction outside the U.S.  
 78.  See generally WORLD BANK GROUP, THE STATE OF SOCIAL SAFETY NETS 2015,
(2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/415491467994645020/pdf/97882-PUB-
REVISED-Box393232B-PUBLIC-DOCDATE-6-29-2015-DOI-10-1596978-1-4648-0543-
1-EPI-1464805431.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMY8-VFBM] (documenting the need for social 
safety nets around the world). 
 79.  As Elizabeth Anderson writes:  
As the economy becomes global, we are all implicated in an international 
division of labor subject to assessment from an egalitarian point of view.  We 
have obligations not only to the citizens of our country but to our fellow 
workers, who are now found in virtually every part of the globe. 
Anderson, supra note 30, at 321 n.78. 
 80.  See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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inequalities within a company’s pay schedule.81  According to the principle 
of diminishing marginal utility, a person derives less utility from each 
additional unit of money received.82  As a person’s income increases, each 
additional unit of income benefits the person less.  An underlying 
assumption here is that a person will spend any additional units of money 
that she receives on goods that are of decreasing importance to her 
welfare.83  Presumably, a person will spend her first dollars on goods that 
satisfy her most urgent needs.  Subsequent dollars will be spent to satisfy 
less urgent needs or preferences.84
Assuming the employees of a company have similar utility functions, 
the diminishing marginal utility of income provides one reason to think that 
the company could increase the overall utility of its workforce by 
decreasing the pay differences between its employees.  To see why, 
suppose a company pays some of its workers significantly more than it 
does others.  By hypothesis, the higher-paid employees derive less utility 
from their last dollar earned than the lower-paid employees would derive 
from it if it were redistributed to them.  Thus, assuming a company has a 
moral duty to increase the overall utility of its workforce, the diminishing 
marginal utility of money can provide the company with a reason to 
redistribute income from its higher-paid to its lower-paid workers, 
minimizing the income inequality between them.85
 81.  Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public 
Expenditures, 85 Q. J. ECON. 409, 409 (1971) (“In the utilitarian discussion of income 
distribution, equality of income is derived from the maximization conditions if it is further 
assumed that individuals have the same utility functions, each with diminishing marginal 
utility.”).
 82.  See Nagel, supra note 34, at 107 (“The principle of diminishing marginal utility 
states that for many goods, a particular further increment has less value to someone who 
already possesses a significant amount of the good than to someone who has less.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 83.  See ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE
ECONOMICS 26-27 (1944) (explaining that the principle of diminishing marginal utility of 
income means that things purchased with each additional “increment of income would be 
things that are rejected when income is smaller because they give less satisfaction . . . .”) 
 84.  For a persuasive explanation, though, of why money does not always have 
diminishing utility, see Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 24-30 
(1987).
 85.  To clarify, the diminishing marginal utility of income does not necessarily entail 
that a company would maximize the utility of its workforce or overall utility by eliminating 
all pay gaps between its workers.  For example, at some point, the decision to flatten a 
company’s pay schedule further could have detrimental effects on the incentives of workers 
to be productive, ultimately reducing the benefits available to both a company’s workers and 
other stakeholders. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 34, at 107 (recognizing that maximizing 
marginal utility must be balanced against, among other things, its effects on incentives to 
work and invest); SEN, supra note 40, at 138-40 (“Inequality may . . . play a functionally 
useful role in encouraging work, enterprise, and investment.”); supra note 41 (discussing the 
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A pay ratio disclosure rule might be justified as a means of providing 
socially responsible stakeholders with information indicating the extent to 
which a company is in a position to increase the overall utility of its 
workforce by redistributing compensation between its employees.  This 
justification also favors the adoption of a max-min pay ratio disclosure rule 
over a max-median rule, like Section 953(b).  By hypothesis, the lowest-
paid worker in a company stands to gain the most utility from obtaining an 
additional unit of income.  Thus, the lowest-paid worker stands to benefit 
more than the median worker from obtaining an additional unit of pay.  
Therefore, the ratio of a CEO’s pay to the compensation of the lowest-paid 
employee in a company is a better indication of how much overall utility 
the company is in a position to promote by redistributing income among its 
employees. 
Insofar as there is public pressure to minimize a disclosed pay ratio, a 
max-min pay ratio disclosure rule would also provide a company with the 
right incentive to make maximally efficient transfers of pay between 
employees.  Under a max-min rule, a company would have the right 
incentive to shift pay from its CEO to its lowest-paid employee.  Other 
things being equal, that would be a utility maximizing transfer of income.  
Under a max-median rule, a company would have a sub-optimal incentive 
to redistribute pay from its CEO to its median worker.  By hypothesis, that 
would not be a maximally efficient transfer. 
3. Prioritarianism 
A prioritarian theory of how to value the welfare of individuals can 
provide a more general reason to object to pay differences between 
employees.  This is a reason that does not depend on (a) the absolute 
magnitude of the well-being of a company’s lower-paid workers or (b) the 
empirical assumption that lower-paid workers would derive a larger benefit 
from receiving an additional unit of pay compared to higher-paid workers.  
A prioritarian case against inequalities within a company’s pay schedule 
does not presume the diminishing marginal utility of income or that any 
lower-paid employees are living below the poverty line.  Instead, the 
prioritarian case is based solely on a conception of how to value the welfare 
of individuals and, consequently, how to value benefits to their welfare. 
According to prioritarians, benefitting a person matters more, the 
worse off she is.86  In other words, the value of improving someone’s well-
“incentive” argument in favor of inequality); supra text accompanying note 27.  The case 
for reducing inequalities within a company’s pay schedule on the basis of the diminishing 
marginal utility of income has its limits.   
 86.  See Parfit, supra note 30, at 101 (addressing the notion that we should give priority 
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being by a particular magnitude is higher, the worse off she is.87  To 
illustrate, suppose we face a choice between providing an equal benefit to 
the welfare of one of two individuals.  That is, we could improve one’s 
well-being by a particular amount or we could improve the other’s well-
being by this same amount.  Suppose, though, that one of these individuals 
is worse off than the other – one has a lower level of well-being than the 
other.  According to prioritarians, all other things being equal, it would be 
better to benefit the worse-off individual.  Even though we stand to benefit 
both persons equally, the interests of the worse-off should take priority 
over the interests of the better-off.88
To develop a fully worked out prioritarian theory of how to value 
benefits to someone’s welfare, there are two crucially important issues that 
must be addressed.  First, like intrinsic egalitarians, prioritarians must 
determine the fundamental unit of concern in their theory.89  When 
determining how much to value a benefit to someone’s well-being, 
prioritarians must determine whether the fundamental unit of concern is (a) 
the quality of the person’s life considered as a whole or (b) the quality of 
her life considered at the time of the benefit.90  On the one hand, 
prioritarians might contend that benefitting a person matters more, the 
worse her life is when considered as a whole.  On the other hand, they 
might claim that benefitting someone matters more, the worse her life at the 
to helping those who are worse off). 
 87.  See Parfit, supra note 30, at 105 (stating that on the Priority View, “utility has 
diminishing marginal moral importance” (emphasis in original)); see also Larry S. Temkin, 
Equality, Priority or What?, 19 ECON. & PHIL. 61, 64 (2003) (writing that according to 
prioritarianism, “there is a diminishing marginal value of well-being, such that the worse off 
someone is in absolute terms, the greater importance or value is attached to improving their 
well-being by a given amount”).  To clarify, the prioritarian thesis can be expressed as the 
diminishing marginal value of welfare, but not resources, such as income. 
 88.  To clarify the relation between prioritarianism and intrinsic egalitarianism, note 
that these views are logically consistent.  A person could coherently accept both 
prioritarianism and intrinsic egalitarianism.  See Parfit, supra note 30, at 103 (mentioning 
the possibility of a “mixed view”).  Nevertheless, these views are logically distinct.  
Intrinsic egalitarianism is an essentially comparative moral view, whereas prioritarianism is 
an essentially non-comparative view.  Unlike intrinsic egalitarians, prioritarians as such 
place no intrinsic value on how one person fares relative to another.  For this reason, 
prioritarianism is not open to the levelling down objection, which threatens the plausibility 
of intrinsic egalitarianism.  See Parfit, supra note 30, at 103-05; cf. supra text accompanying 
notes 52-57.  Like intrinsic egalitarians, though, prioritarians can incorporate into their 
theory an element of personal responsibility, such that how much benefitting people who are 
worse off really matters could depend on how much they are worse off as a result of their 
own fault. See Richard J. Arneson, Debate: Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended 
and Recanted, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 488, 497 (1999) (describing a view of “responsibility-catering 
prioritarianism”); cf. supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
 89.  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 58-61. 
 90.  See Parfit, supra note 30, at 101. 
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time of the benefit.  Alternatively, prioritarians could argue that the value 
of a benefit to someone’s well-being is a complex function of both the 
quality of her life considered as a whole and at the time of the benefit. 
Second, prioritarians must determine how much priority the interests 
of the worse-off should receive.  At one extreme, prioritarians could claim 
that the interests of the worse-off take absolute priority over the interests of 
the better-off.91  On this extreme view, it would be best to benefit the 
worse-off rather than the better-off no matter how much more we could 
benefit the better-off instead.  On a less extreme view, prioritarians can 
contend that the interests of the worse-off take some priority over the 
interests of the better-off, but the priority is not absolute.92  Although 
benefitting people does matter more the worse off they are, it can 
nevertheless be best to confer a relatively large benefit on the better-off 
rather than a relatively small benefit on the worse-off when the difference 
between the magnitudes of these benefits is sufficiently large.93
In light of the essential details of prioritarianism, we can see how a 
prioritarian conception of how to value the welfare of individuals might 
count against inequalities within a company’s pay schedule.  Suppose the 
lower-paid employees in a company are worse off than the higher-paid.  
More precisely, assume the lower-paid workers have a lower quality of life 
considered as a whole and at the time they are compensated compared to 
their higher-paid co-workers.  Then benefitting the lower-paid matters 
more than benefitting the higher-paid.  In other words, increasing the 
welfare of the lower-paid by a particular magnitude would be more 
valuable than increasing the welfare of the higher-paid by the same 
magnitude.94
Consequently, a company might promote more overall value in the 
lives of its employees by redistributing income from its higher-paid to 
lower-paid employees.  Even if lower-paid workers would not derive more 
utility than higher-paid workers from an additional unit of income, the 
additional utility from another unit of income could still be more valuable 
in the life of the lower-paid.  Hence, assuming a company has a moral duty 
to maximize the overall value of the welfare in the lives of its employees, 
prioritarianism can provide the company with a reason to reduce the pay 
differences between its employees by transferring income from its higher-
 91.  See id. at 122-23 (noting that on an extreme priority view, absolute priority should 
be given to those who are worse off). 
 92.  See id. at 121 (noting that absolute priority need not be given to benefitting the 
worse-off under more moderate variants of prioritarianism). 
 93.  See id. (questioning whether the smallest benefit to the worst-off is necessarily 
more valuable than a much greater benefit to the better-off). 
 94.  Id.
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paid to lower-paid employees.95
So prioritarianism can support the adoption of a pay ratio disclosure 
rule as a means to providing socially responsible stakeholders with a source 
of information about the extent to which a company might be in a position 
to make adjustments to its pay schedule that would increase the overall 
value of the well-being of its employees.  Furthermore, this prioritarian 
case for a pay ratio disclosure rule also favors the adoption of a max-min 
rule over a max-median rule, such as Section 953(b). 
Presumably, the lowest-paid employees in a company will be the 
worst-off employees in the company.  Thus, the least-paid employee will 
presumably be worse off than the median employee.  Therefore, under any 
prioritarian theory, the interests of the lowest-paid employee in a company 
should take priority over the interests of any other employee in the 
company, including the median employee.  So compared to a max-median 
rule, a max-min pay ratio disclosure rule would provide a better measure of 
how much value a company might be able to promote in the lives of its 
employees by redistributing income from its higher-paid to its lower-paid 
employees. 
And insofar as a company would face public pressure to minimize a 
disclosed pay ratio, a max-min rule would provide the company with the 
right incentive to redistribute income from its workers with the weakest 
claim to aid to its workers with the most urgent claim.  However, under a 
max-median rule, a company would have a perverse incentive to give 
priority to increasing the compensation of its median employee at the 
unacceptable expense of its least-paid employee. 
B. Non-domination
A more specific egalitarian ideal that could support the adoption of a 
pay ratio disclosure rule locates the value of equality in a kind of 
relationship that should hold between persons.96  It is a relationship of non-
 95.  Like the other moral considerations we have discussed, a company’s moral duty to 
increase the value of its employees’ welfare is not necessarily overriding:  it can compete 
with other moral duties to respect the moral claims of other stakeholders.  For example, the 
managers of a company also owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders to operate the company 
in a way that generates a profit, where increasing profits might entail reducing labor costs.  
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991) (describing how managers have fiduciary duties to equity 
investors).  I leave it an open question how a company should balance such competing 
duties to its various stakeholders. 
 96.  See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note 30, at 43-44, 46; Anderson, supra note 30, at 313; 
Scheffler, supra note 30, at 33-34. 
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domination.97  In this kind of relationship, persons treat each other as, in 
some sense, free and equal.98  To treat another as free and equal in the 
relevant sense, a person must not exercise “an unacceptable degree of 
control over the lives of others.”99  To respect the value of non-domination, 
a person must not exercise an unacceptable degree of power over 
determining what another chooses or has the capacity to choose.100
The value of non-domination can certainly relate to the welfare of an 
individual.  Coercion can harm an individual.  A person could be forced to 
do something that would not be in her best personal interests.  If the person 
had more freedom, she would choose to do something else that would 
better promote her own well-being.101
Nevertheless, although the value of non-domination can relate to the 
welfare of an individual in many cases, these values are arguably distinct 
moral ideals.  Presumably, others could exercise an unacceptable degree of 
power over someone by forcing her to do what is in fact in her best 
personal interests.  Such coercion could constitute an objectionable form of 
paternalism.102  Thus, the egalitarian value of non-domination seems more 
closely related to the value of autonomy:  a person’s capacity to determine 
what happens in her life through her own free choices.103
In light of the value of non-domination, it is apparent how large 
inequalities of wealth could undermine this value by providing some with 
an unacceptably high degree of power over others.  At the societal level, 
suppose resources are concentrated in the hands of a few.  Then the have-
nots might be overly dependent on the haves for obtaining a share of 
 97.  See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note 30, at 44 (explaining that inequality can enable 
people with greater power to exercise an unacceptable degree of control over the lives of 
others); Anderson, supra note 30, at 313, 315; Frederick Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Critique of 
Economic Inequality, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 193, 197 (2013).  For an extended analysis of 
the concept of “non-domination,” see PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF 
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 51-109 (1997). 
 98.  See Anderson, supra note 30, at 327 (discussing the freedom citizens enjoy under a 
conception of democratic equality); Scheffler, supra note 30, at 31 (detailing distributive 
egalitarianism and its understanding of citizens as free and equal).  For an analysis of the 
concept of “free and equal persons,” see RAWLS, supra note 34, at 18-24. 
 99.  Scanlon, supra note 30, at 43-44. 
 100.  See id. at 43-44, 46 (discussing some negative effects of imbalances of power); 
Parfit, supra note 30, at 86 (noting the possibility that inequalities could have the bad effect 
of putting “some people in the power of others”). 
 101.  See, e.g., T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 251-52 (1998) 
(describing an instrumental value of choice). 
 102.  See id. at 254 (discussing reasons to object to a principle permitting “paternalistic 
interference in a person’s life”). 
 103.  Cf. PETTIT, supra note 97, at 81-82 (comparing the ideal of non-domination with 
the ideal of personal autonomy or “self-mastery”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
369-430 (1986) (discussing the moral and political importance of autonomy). 
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resources necessary to living a life with dignity.  The owners of resources 
would possess an extraordinarily high degree of bargaining power over 
others considered both individually and collectively.  So those with 
resources would have an extraordinarily high degree of power over 
determining the terms of any agreement with those in need.  Consequently, 
the few with resources might exercise an unacceptable degree of control 
over determining the options available to others and their prospects for 
actually obtaining those options. 
In the setting of a particular company, inequalities of income could 
contribute in a similar way to undermining the value of non-domination in 
the relationships of lower-paid workers.  The relevant relationships could 
be both internal and external to the company.  Suppose the lower-paid 
employees of a company possess much less wealth than others inside or 
outside the company.  As a result, the wealthier could have an unacceptably 
high degree of power over determining the life prospects of the lower-paid 
workers both internal and external to the company.  Outside the company, 
the lower-paid could be unreasonably forced into their ways of life away 
from work.  For example, the lower-paid might be forced to live in certain 
areas, in certain kinds of housing, and to engage in or abstain from certain 
activities that are normally the objects of free choice among others. 
Inside a company, higher-paid employees could have not only more 
wealth than the lower-paid, but also managerial authority over the lower-
paid.  Assuming the lower-paid lack sufficiently good exit options, their 
higher-paid managers might have an unacceptably high degree of power 
over determining what the lower-paid do for the company and the 
conditions under which they do it.  Hence, the lower-paid could be 
unacceptably vulnerable to being forced to perform work that is not 
sufficiently respectful of their dignity or to perform work under conditions 
that are not sufficiently humane.  Perhaps the greater power of the higher-
paid could even have a corrupting influence on them, disposing them to be 
less sensitive to the interests of their lower-paid subordinates.104  In that 
case, the lower-paid could be not only unacceptably vulnerable, but also at 
an unacceptably high risk of being coerced into performing undignified 
work under inhumane conditions. 
The fact that income inequalities within companies can contribute to 
undermining the value of non-domination in the relationships of lower-paid 
workers might provide a justification for a pay ratio disclosure rule.  The 
pay ratio disclosed could serve as an indication of the risk that lower-paid 
 104.  See Sreedhari D. Desai et al., Meaner Managers: A Consequence of Income 
Inequality, in SOCIAL DECISION MAKING: SOCIAL DILEMMAS, SOCIAL VALUES, AND ETHICAL
JUDGMENTS 315, 315 (Roderick M. Kramer et al. eds., 2010) (noting that power 
concentrations can lead managers to distance themselves from subordinates). 
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employees in a company are living at the mercy of others who possess an 
unacceptably high degree of power over the lower-paid either inside or 
outside the company.  Socially responsible stakeholders could value this 
information as a means to determining whether a company should adjust its 
pay schedule to protect better the autonomy of its lower-paid workers. 
In addition to supporting the adoption of a pay ratio disclosure rule in 
general, the value of non-domination also favors more specifically the 
adoption of a max-min rule over a max-median rule, like Section 953(b), 
for two reasons.  First, the least-paid worker in a company is likely the 
most vulnerable to the worst sort of domination in her relationships both 
internal and external to the company.  Relative to the median employee of a 
company, the least-paid likely has less wealth overall and worse overall 
opportunities both inside and outside the company.  Thus, relative to the 
median employee, the least-paid is more at risk of relationships that harm 
her autonomy—relationships in which others exercise an unacceptably high 
degree of control over her way of life.  So the least-paid worker in a 
company likely has the strongest, most urgent claim to protection from 
domination. 
Second, insofar as a company faces public pressure to minimize a pay 
ratio required for disclosure, a max-median rule would provide a company 
with a perverse incentive to make its most vulnerable employees even more 
vulnerable to domination by others.  As we have discussed, under a max-
median rule, a company would have a perverse incentive to transfer pay 
from its lowest-paid workers to its higher-paid median worker.105  Such an 
illicit transfer might benefit the autonomy of the median employee, but 
only at an unacceptable cost to those whose autonomy stands in more 
urgent need of protection. 
Unlike a max-median pay ratio disclosure rule, a max-min rule would 
provide a company with the right incentive to protect its workers who are 
most vulnerable to domination.  Under a max-min rule, a company would 
have the right incentive to transfer pay from its highest-paid employees to 
its lowest-paid employees.  Presumably, such a transfer would reduce the 
power that the highest-paid have over others.  Such a progressive transfer 
would increase the control that the most vulnerable workers in the company 
have over their own lives. 
C. Fairness 
Considerations of fairness could provide another ground on which to 
 105.  See supra text accompanying note 48. 
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object to pay disparities within a company.106  Income inequalities within a 
company could indicate some sort of unfairness in a competitive process 
for obtaining certain goods.  In other words, a pay difference between 
employees might indicate that some have an unfair advantage in the 
competitive pursuit of certain goods.  If so, then others would be at an 
unfair disadvantage in their prospects for obtaining the relevant goods.  Ex 
ante, a pay disparity could be the result of some past unfairness in a 
competitive process.  Ex post, income inequalities could result in producing 
various kinds of unfairness in future competitions for goods. 
The moral ideal of fairness can relate to the aforementioned values of 
welfare and non-domination.  Unfairness in the pursuit of certain goods can 
harm the well-being of persons and lead to their overdependence on the 
will of others.  For example, imagine a society characterized by a caste 
system.  In this society, high-paying jobs are reserved for those in the 
higher caste.  Those in the lower caste are eligible only for low-paying 
jobs, where they would be subservient to members of the higher caste.  
Consequently, people in the higher caste typically enjoy lives of opulence, 
while individuals in the lower caste live in poverty under conditions 
dictated to them by the affluent. 
Suppose membership in the higher caste is determined by membership 
in an exclusive set of families.  Those in the lower caste can achieve 
upward social mobility only through the rare event of marriage or adoption 
into one of the privileged families.  In this society, members of the lower 
caste are at an unfair disadvantage relative to the higher caste in their 
pursuit of a high-paying job, which would afford them a life with a decent 
level of autonomy and well-being.  This unfairness would result directly in 
both the suffering of individuals in the lower caste and their domination by 
those in the higher caste.  Moreover, members of both the lower and higher 
castes could suffer losses in their welfare because the high-paying jobs in 
their society are not necessarily going to those with the most merit to 
perform such jobs. 
However, although fairness can relate to the values of welfare and 
non-domination in many cases, it is arguably a distinct moral ideal.  An 
individual can have a claim against unfair treatment in the pursuit of a good 
even if she does not suffer a loss in her well-being or autonomy as a result 
of the unfair treatment.  To illustrate, consider again the caste-based society 
just discussed.  In this society, every individual in the lower caste is at an 
unfair disadvantage in pursuing a high-paying job given that such jobs are 
 106.  See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note 30, at 44 (“Some forms of equality are essential 
preconditions for the fairness of certain processes.”); Parfit, supra note 30, at 88-89 (noting 
that considerations of fairness could constitute a “deontic egalitarian” reason against certain 
inequalities).
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reserved for those in the higher caste, and familial relations determine 
membership in the higher caste.  Everyone in the lower caste has a claim 
against such unfairness in her pursuit of a high-paying job. 
Now assume an individual in the lower caste has the rare fortune of 
moving up in the social hierarchy by marrying into one of the privileged 
families.  As a result of his luck, this individual obtains a high-paying job 
and suffers none of the losses in well-being or autonomy that typically 
burden those in his former caste.  Nevertheless, this individual was still at 
an unfair disadvantage in pursuing a high-paying job in the first place, and 
he had a claim against such unfairness even though it did not ultimately 
impair his welfare or autonomy.  In general, people can be treated unfairly 
even if the unfair treatment does not ultimately harm their welfare or 
autonomy. 
1. The Pay Setting Process 
In a capitalist economy, I presume the compensation package 
provided to each employee of a company should be the result of a fair 
situation of bargaining.  The pay to each worker in a company should be 
the outcome of a fair process of bargaining.107  Any unfairness in the 
process of negotiating a worker’s pay is grounds for complaint.  Not 
necessarily a legal complaint, but a moral complaint at the very least. 
An extraordinarily large pay gap between employees of a company 
could indicate some kind of unfairness in the processes used to determine 
pay within the company.  On the one hand, higher-paid workers in the 
company might have an unfair advantage in the negotiation of their 
compensation.  They might have too much bargaining power over 
negotiating their pay.  On the other hand, lower-paid workers could be at an 
unfair disadvantage in the pay-setting process.  They might have too little 
bargaining power over the determination of their income. 
a. Executive Compensation 
To illustrate the first possibility, consider the CEO of a company.  A 
CEO’s compensation package is usually determined by the company’s 
board of directors.108  A CEO’s pay is ultimately the result of a negotiation 
 107.  Cf. MORIARTY, supra note 6, at 258 (describing a view according to which a just 
wage is the outcome of a bargaining process containing “no imperfections (e.g., fraud, 
coercion)”).
 108.  See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that, more precisely, a 
CEO’s pay is usually determined by the compensation committee of the board of directors, 
where the compensation committee is composed exclusively of independent directors). 
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between the CEO and the company’s board.  To be fair, the negotiation 
should be carried out at arm’s length.109  There should be no force, fraud, or 
biases among the board of directors favoring the CEO.  Biases could result 
in the board’s not caring sufficiently about the interests of other 
stakeholders who stand to be harmed by excessive CEO compensation.  
Examples of these other stakeholders include, among others, the company’s 
shareholders, other employees, and customers.  Presumably, excessive 
CEO pay could otherwise be used to increase shareholder value, raise other 
workers’ wages, or reduce prices charged to consumers. 
A variety of factors, though, could bias a board in favor of the CEO.  
These biases could provide the CEO with an unfair advantage in 
negotiating his pay with the board. With too much bargaining power, the 
CEO would be in a position to extract “rent” in the negotiation process.110
In this context, rent would be excessive compensation not justified on any 
reasonable basis for awarding CEO pay. 
To clarify, excessive CEO compensation would not be necessary to 
hire, retain, or optimally motivate the CEO to run the company.111
Excessive CEO pay would not be necessary to provide optimal incentives 
to other workers who might aspire to increase their productivity in order to 
move up the company ranks.112  And excessive CEO pay would not be 
necessary to signal to investors or any other relevant stakeholders anything 
sufficiently important about the company itself or its CEO relative to other 
peer firms or their CEOs.113  In short, excessive CEO compensation would 
unjustifiably harm the interests of other stakeholders that the board should 
respect when negotiating over the CEO’s pay. 
 109.  Cf. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 23 (suggesting that shareholders would be 
protected from the mal-aligned interests of corporate executives and directors under the 
arm’s-length model); CRYSTAL, supra note 6, at 215 (emphasizing the importance of an 
arm’s length negotiation between a CEO and the board of directors in determining the 
CEO’s compensation); MORIARTY, supra note 6, at 259 (suggesting that true arm’s-length 
negotiations would indeed result in lower and more just levels of executive compensation). 
 110.  See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 62 (describing, in contrast to the 
arm’s length model, the managerial power model, which leads to the extraction of “rents” 
due to unfair bargaining power); STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 39-40 (noting that CEOs with 
unchecked powers can secure higher incomes by taking from others rather than generating 
wealth). 
 111.  Cf. Jeffrey Moriarty, How Much Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?, 19 
BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 237 (2009) (defining the “minimum effective compensation” of a CEO 
(emphasis in original)). 
 112.  See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 113.  See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 6, at 221 (describing a company’s “institutional 
pride” as a motivation for not paying its CEO “below the average”); Edward J. Zajac & 
James D. Westphal, Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and 
Symbolism, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 283, 283-84 (1995); Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO
Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 280, 289-90 (2009). 
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The factors that could bias a board in favor of granting a CEO too 
much pay can range from the obvious to the more subtle.  Consider six 
potential biases.114  First, a CEO might have a significant influence over 
who ultimately gets nominated and appointed to serve on his company’s 
board of directors.115  As a result, directors could be inclined to grant a 
CEO excessive pay as a means of strengthening their tenure on the board.116
Directors might fear that unless they concede to a CEO’s demand for 
excessive compensation, the CEO will oppose or not support their future 
re-nomination and re-appointment to continue serving on the board.117
Second, even if directors do not feel any fear that a CEO will oppose 
or not support their re-nomination and re-appointment to the board, 
directors might still feel a debt of gratitude to the CEO for supporting their 
nomination and appointment in the first place.118  To reciprocate, directors 
could again be inclined to award a CEO with excessive compensation.119
Third, some directors might have a personal friendship with the 
CEO.120  The friendship could have preceded their appointment to the board 
or it might have developed after.121  Assuming friends are in some sense 
partial to each other’s interests, a relation of friendship between directors 
and a CEO could motivate the directors to overpay the CEO.122
Fourth, a CEO might serve on the board of her own company.123
Directors can have an interest in promoting an atmosphere of congeniality 
 114.  The relevant biases could be either conscious or subconscious among a board of 
directors. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (discussing the related concept of 
implicit biases). 
 115.  See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 26-27 (discussing the powerful 
influence that CEOs can possess, even if they are not formally on the nominating 
committee, over who gets nominated to serve on the board). 
 116.  See id. (explaining that “sparring with the CEO over executive compensation” can 
create “friction and unpleasantness” which directors may wish to avoid). 
 117.  Even in the absence of an explicit demand for excessive pay by the CEO, directors 
could be motivated to take the initiative in offering the CEO excessive compensation as a 
means of generating the goodwill between them that could improve the directors’ prospects 
for being re-elected to the board. 
 118.  See MORIARTY, supra note 6, at 260 (mentioning the gratitude that directors might 
feel for being nominated for a “prestigious, lucrative, and undemanding” job). 
 119.  See id. (explaining the phenomenon in terms of “return[ing] the favor”). 
 120.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 31 (describing friendship and loyalty as 
one of the social and psychological factors that compromises equitable CEO-director 
relationships).
 121.  Id.
 122.  See id. (suggesting that because CEOs often play a role in recruiting and 
onboarding directors, directors have less of an incentive to bargain effectively over CEO 
pay).
 123.  See id. at 32 (noting the potential for an even closer relationship). 
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among all board members.124  More socially harmonious relations among 
directors could make serving on the board a more pleasant experience.  
Conversely, disharmony among directors could produce tension, making 
service on the board unpleasant.  To promote more congenial relations with 
a CEO serving on the board, other directors might be inclined to pay the 
CEO more than they should all things considered.125
Fifth, a director of a company could have an economic interest in 
receiving higher director compensation.126  A director could have an 
interest in establishing business relations with the company sometime in 
the future, perhaps after retiring from the board.127  Alternatively, a director 
of a company could have an interest in serving on the boards of other 
companies.128  To promote such personal objectives, a director of a 
company could benefit from the support and recommendation of the 
company’s CEO.  More generally, the director could benefit from 
developing a reputation for working with a CEO on favorable terms.  To 
develop such a reputation and secure the relevant support and 
recommendation of a CEO, a director might also be inclined to overpay the 
CEO.129
Sixth, companies can have inter-locking boards.130  The CEO of one 
company can serve on the board of another company, while the CEO of the 
latter company serves on the board of the former.  Once CEOs start serving 
on the boards of each other’s companies, CEO-directors can be inclined to 
support the grant of excessive compensation to other CEOs.131  When one 
 124.  See id. (describing an interest in promoting collegiality among directors). 
 125.  See id. (making the switch from colleagues to arm’s-length bargainers in 
compensation negotiations is challenging).  
 126.  See id. at 30-31 (noting that “[d]irectors have a natural interest in their own 
compensation, which CEOs may be able to influence” and social and psychological factors 
cause directors to pursue their interest in increased compensation); CRYSTAL, supra note 6, 
at 229-30 (describing the typical game played between directors and CEOs when ensuring 
that directors are paid sufficiently). 
 127.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 27-29 (exposing the tendency for 
incestuous business relations and mentioning new independence standards that attempt to 
limit such relations but ultimately fall short). 
 128.  See id. at 36 (“Earning a reputation for challenging CEO compensation has been 
unlikely to help [the director’s case for being appointed to another board], and if anything 
has been likely to hurt the director’s prospects of securing appointments to other boards.”). 
 129.  See id. at 27-29, 30-31, 36 (noting that the CEO is in a position to directly benefit 
directors’ compensation packages, whether now or in the future, and this encourages 
directors to negotiate CEO pay from a collegial perspective rather than an arm’s length 
position).
 130.  See, e.g., id. at 29-30 (indicating that this phenomenon is actually quite prevalent). 
 131.  See, e.g., id. (describing the practice as an example of yet another source of 
influence that CEOs have over directors); MORIARTY, supra note 6, at 261 (describing the 
process by which CEO pay becomes inflated as a result of inter-locking boards); CRYSTAL,
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company raises the pay of its own CEO, other companies can feel pressure 
to do the same for their CEOs, thus raising the pay of CEOs generally.132
One worry is that if a CEO were to receive a below average 
compensation package, his below average pay could be interpreted as a 
negative sign about the financial condition of the company itself or the 
ability, motivation, or contribution of its CEO.133  In this sense, executive 
compensation can be subject to a “Lake Wobegon Effect,” where no 
company wants to compensate its CEO with below average pay, at least 
among peer firms.134
In light of some ways in which a board can be biased in favor of a 
CEO, it is apparent that there are numerous ways in which a CEO’s pay can 
fail to be the result of an arm’s length negotiation or, therefore, a fair 
process of bargaining.135  The gap between a CEO’s pay and the pay of 
other workers in his company could be a source of information about the 
fairness of the process through which the CEO’s pay was determined.136
An extremely large gap, considered by itself or in relation to the gap in peer 
firms, could indicate that the CEO had an unfair advantage over the 
supra note 6, at 227-28 (noting that when CEOs sit on the boards of other companies, CEO 
pay rises). 
 132.  See, e.g., MORIARTY, supra note 6, at 261 (pointing out that it is standard for boards 
to compare the compensation of their own CEOs with the compensation of other CEOs in 
peer firms); CRYSTAL, supra note 6, at 221, 227-28 (dubbing the practice “survey 
ratcheting” and explaining how it undermines arm’s length negotiating); HAYES &
SCHAEFER, supra note 113, at 280 (dubbing the phenomenon the “Lake Wobegon Effect”). 
 133.  See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 6, at 221 (connecting this thought process to the 
institutional pride argument); HAYES & SCHAEFER, supra note 113, at 280 (describing how 
the peer group justification for pay generates an “upward spiral”). 
 134.  HAYES & SCHAEFER, supra note 113, at 280. 
 135.  For more extensive analysis of how the pay-setting process for determining 
executive compensation can fall short of an arm’s length negotiation, see BEBCHUK & FRIED,
supra note 6, at 23-44; MORIARTY, supra note 6, at 259-62.  To clarify, though, I do not 
assert that executive compensation is never the result of an arm’s length negotiation in any 
company.  Some companies can have stronger, more independent boards than others.  There 
are also in place various corporate governance provisions aimed at reducing the risk that 
boards in general will award excessive compensation to executives.  For example, in 
addition to a pay ratio disclosure rule, the Dodd-Frank Act includes a number of other rules 
aimed at reining in excessive CEO pay.  Dodd-Frank Act §§ 951-957 (2010).  The extent to 
which boards and CEOs are engaging in an arm’s length negotiation over the determination 
of executive compensation is an empirical issue that can vary from company to company. 
 136.  Cf. T. M. Scanlon, When Does Equality Matter? 3, 36 (last visited Aug. 12, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) 
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/ltw-Scanlon.pdf) 
[https://perma.cc/LJ66-GQYH] (suggesting that a large inequality between the 
compensation of a CEO and other workers might be objectionable because of problems with 
the “mechanism” that determines executive compensation); COTTON, supra note 28, at 157 
(arguing that a company’s disclosure of a pay ratio could improve fairness in executive 
compensation).
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negotiation of his pay.  Thus, a pay ratio disclosure rule might be justifiable 
on the grounds of providing socially responsible stakeholders with 
information indicating whether a CEO possesses too much bargaining 
power over the determination of his own pay.137
b. Non-executive Compensation 
Consider the compensation of lower-level workers in a company.  
Unlike executive compensation, the pay of rank-and-file employees is not 
usually determined directly by a company’s board of directors.  Instead, it 
is set by a company’s managers.  If there is any negotiation in the process 
of setting the pay of lower-level employees, the negotiation is between the 
lower-level employees and the managers of the company or their respective 
agents negotiating on their behalf.138
A variety of factors could disadvantage, perhaps unfairly, lower-level 
employees when negotiating with managers over pay.  As a result of such 
factors, lower-level workers might have insufficient bargaining power over 
the determination of their compensation.  In general, managers will often 
have significantly more bargaining power in the pay-setting process than 
any individual rank-and-file employee considered as such.  In the standard 
case, an individual rank-and-file worker is easy to replace.  Thus, some 
might contend that ordinary workers are vulnerable to being unfairly 
exploited in the pay-setting process unless they have the right to bargain 
collectively with management.139  In jurisdictions where workers lack 
 137.  Cf. SCANLON, supra note 136, at 36 (suggesting the possibility that a CEO could 
have too much “power” in determining his own pay). 
 138.  See generally Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., How Do Labor and Management 
View Collective Bargaining?, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 23 (Oct. 1998), 
www.jstor.org/stable/41844812 [https://perma.cc/2ZS2-HLZH] (surveying the process of 
collective bargaining between labor and management). 
 139.  Cf. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, WORKER VOICE IN A TIME OF RISING INEQUALITY
1 (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/cea_worker_voice_issue_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7XV-GWRL] (discussing the benefits to workers of higher unionization 
rates and the costs to them of lower unionization rates); Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, 
Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 514 (2011) 
(same); M. Bronfenbrenner, The Economics of Collective Bargaining, 53 Q. J. ECON. 535, 
541 n.7 (1939) (noting “the possibility of the exploitation of labor” and stating that 
“[c]ollective bargaining may be a force in eliminating” certain types of exploitation); DAVID
COOPER & LAWRENCE MISHEL, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING HAS WIDENED THE GAP BETWEEN PRODUCTIVITY AND PAY 4 (2015), 
http://www.epi.org/files/2013/collective-bargaining-productivity-pay.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YYX3-B5Q6] (“Any effort to reestablish a link between pay and 
productivity growth will need to promote policies that enable workers to once again join 
unions and bargain collectively.”). 
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collective bargaining rights, lower-level workers could be unfairly 
disadvantaged in the process of determining their pay.140
Even if workers possess some collective bargaining rights, those rights 
could be too weak to provide them with enough bargaining power to make 
the pay-setting process fair.  For example, sufficiently strong collective 
bargaining rights might deny an individual worker the right to enjoy the 
benefits of a collective bargaining agreement without paying his fair share 
of the union costs required to negotiate the agreement.141  Some 
jurisdictions might make it too easy for individual workers to avoid paying 
their fair share of what is required to negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement with their company.142  More generally, jurisdictions might deny 
workers the collective right to protest effectively against management 
decisions that they find objectionable.  Jurisdictions could unfairly limit the 
rights of employees to organize a strike, boycott, or other forms of effective 
protest against a company.143
 140.  U.S. workers in the private sector generally have collective bargaining rights.  See
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012) (discussing labor management 
relations generally).  However, not all U.S. workers in the public sector have the right to 
bargain collectively. See MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY
RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 3-6 
(2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8LY-
P68H] (outlining the legality of collective bargaining for firefighters, police, and teachers by 
state).  Outside of the U.S., even workers in the private sector can be denied collective 
bargaining rights. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT 44 (2016), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253157.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4RUV-5GX6] (noting that the law of Saudi Arabia “does not provide for 
the right of workers to form and join independent unions.  The law does not provide for the 
right to collective bargaining or the right to conduct legal strikes.  The law does not prohibit 
antiunion discrimination or require reinstatement of workers fired for union activity”).
 141.  In the U.S., so called “right to work” laws give an individual employee this precise 
right to free ride on the work of unions. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Olson, What Right-to-Work 
Laws Really Mean, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/01/31/what-right-to-
work-laws-really-mean/ [https://perma.cc/YZ8A-SZGR] (arguing that “right to work” laws 
would create a free-rider problem).  For discussion of the negative consequences to workers 
in general of “right to work” laws, see ELISE GOULD & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, ECON. POLICY
INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 299, THE COMPENSATION PENALTY OF “RIGHT-TO-WORK” LAWS 1-2 
(2011), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/BriefingPaper299.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VNG4-TDRD] (listing the negative consequences of “right to work” laws 
and noting that “right to work” laws do not guarantee a job for anyone); ELISE GOULD &
WILL KIMBALL, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 395, “RIGHT-TO-WORK” STATES
STILL HAVE LOWER WAGES 2 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/82934.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82ZJ-PT5Y] (stating non-paying members still get union benefits). 
 142.  See, e.g., Olson, supra note 141 (comparing states that have “right to work” laws 
with those that do not); Gould & Shierholz, supra note 141, at 1 (same); Gould & Kimball, 
supra note 141, at 8 (same). 
 143.  For a dramatic illustration of a government’s ability to impair workers’ right to 
strike, albeit in the public sector, see Joseph A. McCartin, The Strike that Busted Unions,
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And even if workers have sufficiently strong collective bargaining 
rights, there can still be impediments to exercising those rights.  Various 
forms of corruption can prevent workers from effectively exercising 
collective bargaining rights.  Companies might coerce workers not to 
unionize.  At one extreme, companies can use violence to break up any 
attempt among employees to form a union.144  Union leaders can also fall 
prey to corruption, violating their fiduciary duty to bargain effectively on 
behalf of workers in the pay-setting process.  At another extreme, union 
leaders might accept bribes from companies they are negotiating with in 
exchange for accepting lower wages or benefits for union workers.145
Given such possible sources of unfairness, a pay ratio disclosure rule 
might be justified as a means to providing socially responsible stakeholders 
with information about the extent of any unfairness in the pay-setting 
process for lower-level employees.  An extremely large gap between the 
compensation of higher-paid and lower-paid employees in a company 
might indicate that the lower paid are unfairly disadvantaged in the process 
of determining their pay.  Furthermore, the size of the gap might indicate 
the magnitude of the unfairness:  the larger the gap, the stronger the 
evidence of a worse degree of unfairness. 
For two reasons, this fairness-based justification of a pay ratio 
disclosure rule also favors the adoption of a max-min rule over a max-
median rule, such as Section 953(b).146  First, insofar as companies would 
face public pressure to minimize a disclosed pay ratio, a max-median rule 
could actually exacerbate the unfairness in a company’s pay-setting process 
for lower-level workers.  As we have noted, under a max-median rule, a 
company would have a perverse incentive to transfer income from its 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/opinion/reagan-vs-patco-
the-strike-that-busted-unions.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/7GQ2-7CR4], (discussing 
President Reagan’s decision to fire over 11,000 air traffic controllers on strike in 1981). 
 144.  See, e.g., Sibylla Brodzinsky, Coca-Cola Boycott Launched After Killings at 
Colombian Plants, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 23, 2003), 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/jul/24/marketingandpr.colombia 
[https://perma.cc/3SLG-89XY] (describing military force used against labor organizers); 
Juan Forero, Union Says Coca-Cola in Columbia Uses Thugs, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 26, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/26/world/union-says-coca-cola-in-colombia-uses-
thugs.html [https://perma.cc/4UMQ-6MGQ] (same). 
 145.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Former 
Carpenters Union Leader Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court, Admitting Years of 
Racketeering, Illegal Payments, and Obstruction of Justice (Jul. 16, 2010), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2010/nyfo071610.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VSS8-JSEW] (noting impending prosecution of a union leader). 
 146.  Both max-min and max-median pay ratio disclosure rules could provide 
comparable indications of the extent of any unfairness in determining the compensation of a 
company’s CEO.  The considerations favoring a max-min rule over a max-median rule stem 
primarily from a concern for fairness in setting the pay of lower-level employees. 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 131 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 131 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
6_STAIHAR-TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/17 4:02 PM
2017] INCOME INEQUALITY AND PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE 495 
lower-paid workers to its higher-paid median worker.  Such a regressive 
transfer of income would increase the risk of unfairness in the pay-setting 
process for lower-level workers. 
Presumably, the lower-paid employees in a company tend to be worse 
off than the higher-paid, and the worse-off have the stronger claim against 
unfair treatment.  Other things being equal, I suggest that treating the 
worse-off unfairly is a greater evil than treating the better-off unfairly.147
Furthermore, I presume that lower-paid workers are also more vulnerable 
to unfair treatment in the pay-setting process:  they have weaker bargaining 
power than higher-paid workers.  So transferring income from lower-paid 
employees to the higher-paid median employee of a company would make 
the more vulnerable members of the company even more vulnerable to 
even worse forms of unfairness in the pay-setting process. 
A max-min rule would tend to have the opposite effect.  As we have 
noted, under a max-min rule, a company would have the right incentive to 
transfer income from its higher-paid to its lower-paid employees.  Such 
progressive transfers would lower the risk of unfairness in the pay-setting 
process.  These transfers would minimize the vulnerability of a company’s 
most vulnerable workers to unfair treatment in the pay-setting process. 
Second, the pay ratio disclosed under a max-min rule would have 
greater moral significance than the ratio disclosed under a max-median 
rule.  Other things being equal, the claims for fair treatment of a company’s 
least-paid workers should take priority over the claims of higher-paid 
workers.148  A max-min rule would provide an indication of whether the 
employees with the strongest claim against unfair treatment in the pay-
setting process are in fact being treated unfairly.  Relative to a max-min 
rule, a max-median rule would provide information only about better off 
employees with weaker claims against unfair treatment in the determination 
of their pay.  Thus, a max-min rule would provide socially responsible 
stakeholders with a more important measure of any unfairness in a 
company’s pay-setting process for lower-level employees. 
2. Equality of Opportunity 
Considerations of fairness might entail that the major institutions of a 
society, including companies, should be organized to provide its members 
with, in some sense, an equal opportunity to obtain certain sorts of goods.149
 147.  Here I propose a prioritarian conception of how to assess the strength of the 
fairness claims of individuals. 
 148.  See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 149.  Cf. RAWLS, supra note 34, at 42 (“Social and economic inequalities . . . are to be 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
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In a society organized in this way, people would have, in some sense, equal 
prospects or, in other words, equal chances of obtaining the relevant 
goods.150  The class of goods might include, among others, those of an 
economic, political, or social character that are ordinarily of special 
concern to individuals.151  Absent some special justification, persons with 
worse prospects than others for obtaining the relevant goods would have a 
moral complaint of being treated unfairly by the institutions that caused the 
inequality or could rectify the inequality. 
To clarify, the demand for equality of opportunity need not be 
indefeasible.  Special considerations might defeat a moral claim against 
having lower chances of obtaining the relevant goods.  For example, there 
can be considerations of personal responsibility.152  An individual could be 
at a disadvantage in obtaining some benefit, such as a certain sort of 
occupation, because of factors for which he is personally responsible.  
Perhaps the person freely chose not to develop the sorts of skills or talents 
necessary to be qualified for the job.  The resources were available to him 
to develop the required skills and talents, but he freely chose not to develop 
them from a lack of motivation.153  In this case, the individual would have 
worse prospects for obtaining the relevant occupation than others who 
freely chose to develop the necessary qualifications.  However, because he 
is personally responsible for being at a disadvantage, he might lack any 
moral claim that other people take steps to improve his prospects for 
obtaining the position. 
Alternatively, suppose someone has worse prospects than others 
through no fault of her own.  The person might then have a moral claim to 
others’ redressing the inequality.  Nevertheless, her claim could still be 
overridden by various countervailing considerations.  There might be no 
way to satisfy the individual’s claim without sacrificing something of 
greater moral significance.154  Perhaps the costs of rectifying the inequality 
opportunity.”).
 150.  Cf. id. at 43 (“[F]air equality of opportunity is said to require . . . that all should 
have a fair chance to attain” public offices and social positions). 
 151.  Cf. NAGEL, supra note 34, at 106 (“Contemporary political debate recognizes four 
types of equality:  political, legal, social, and economic.”); RAWLS, supra note 34, at 57 
(explaining that the range of goods covered by a principle of equality of opportunity can 
include “primary goods,” which “are various social conditions and all-purpose means that 
are generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their . . . 
moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good”). 
 152.  See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
 153.  Cf. RAWLS, supra note 34, at 44 (“In all parts of society there are to be roughly the 
same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed.”). 
 154.  Cf. SINGER, supra note 71, at 231 (“[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought, morally, to do it.”). 
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would be too high, imposing an undue burden on others.  More specifically, 
the means of providing the individual with an equal opportunity could be 
unjust, violating the rights of others. In essence, the demand for equality of 
opportunity can compete with other moral ideals, such as considerations of 
utility or other principles of justice.155  But although the demand for 
equality of opportunity can be defeated in some cases by countervailing 
moral considerations, it can still retain considerable moral weight with 
overriding significance in other cases. 
Different egalitarians can endorse different sets of goods that people 
should have an equal opportunity of obtaining.  These goods might include 
various offices, positions, material resources, or other less tangible 
advantages that generally have significant instrumental or intrinsic value 
for the welfare of individuals.  As we have noted, the goods could have an 
economic, political, or more social character.156
Under an economic ideal of equality of opportunity, people should 
have, in some sense, equal prospects of obtaining a range of economic 
goods.  These goods might include money, different forms of wealth, and 
jobs.  Under a political ideal of equality of opportunity, people should have, 
in some sense, equal prospects of influencing their government.157  To 
realize an ideal of political equality, persons should have, in some sense, 
equal chances of holding political offices, influencing the decisions of 
those who hold political offices, and determining the outcome of elections.  
More generally, egalitarians could contend that individuals should have an 
equal opportunity of obtaining certain social goods, such as the “social 
bases of self-respect” or esteem from others.158  These goods might include 
various social roles or accomplishments that advance one’s social standing 
or status in society and tend to strengthen one’s sense of self-fulfillment 
and self-worth. 
Given the range of goods that people might possess a claim to having 
an equal opportunity of obtaining, it is apparent how income inequalities 
within a society could undermine this egalitarian ideal in straightforward 
 155.  Cf. supra text accompanying note 55; SCANLON, supra note 30, at 45 (noting that 
an egalitarian reason could be “one moral idea among others, which might have to be 
sacrificed or balanced for the sake of other values”). 
 156.  See supra text accompanying note 151. 
 157.  Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 358 (1993) (expressing a political ideal 
that “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of influencing the 
government’s policy and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their economic 
and social class”). 
 158.  See RAWLS, supra note 34, at 59 (understanding the “social bases of self-respect” 
as “those aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense 
of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence”); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440-46 (1971) (discussing the value of self-respect). 
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ways.  Consider first economic goods in a society characterized by large 
inequalities of wealth, resulting in part from large inequalities of income.  
In this society, the haves and the have-nots, including their children, might 
possess the same innate abilities and be similarly motivated to succeed.  
Nevertheless, the haves would be able to afford better educational 
opportunities for themselves and their children.159  These better educational 
opportunities would not be within the budget constraints of the have-nots.  
As a result, the haves and their progeny would enjoy better prospects for 
developing the skills necessary to compete for the higher-paying 
occupations within the society.  As a further consequence, the society 
would exhibit low levels of “intergenerational earnings mobility.”160
Consider a political ideal of equality of opportunity.  In a society with 
a democratic form of government and a capitalist economy, the haves 
might possess political views of comparable merit to the views of the have-
nots.  Furthermore, their political talents might be comparable as well.  
Nevertheless, the haves would be able to afford to fund more effective 
campaigns than the have-nots, considered individually or collectively.  So 
the haves would have better prospects for winning an election to serve in 
political office. 
In addition, the haves would possess an advantage in lobbying current 
political office holders, determining the candidates and issues that go up for 
a vote, and influencing the outcomes of elections and voting matters more 
generally.  In short, the haves would possess a better chance of influencing 
the outcomes of the government than the have-nots.  The haves would 
enjoy this political advantage not because their political views have more 
merit or because they are more talented or motivated politicians than the 
have-nots.  Rather their advantage would stem simply from their greater 
wealth affording them more political influence.161
 159.  Here I presume that the relevant society, such as the U.S., has not succeeded in 
establishing “equal opportunities of education for all regardless of family income.”  RAWLS,
supra note 34, at 44 (discussing generally the need for the greatest benefit to flow to the 
least-advantaged members of a society); see also Scanlon, supra note 136, at 26 (writing 
that a challenge of “achieving fair equality of opportunity . . . lies in the cost and difficulty 
of supplying all children with early childhood education that will enable them to develop 
intellectually”); STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 24 (noting the educational inequality in the U.S.).  
 160.  Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational 
Mobility, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 79, 80 (2013) (describing how higher inequality limits 
opportunities, and thereby mobility, for younger generations).  
 161.  See Norman Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty, in READING
RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWL’S A THEORY OF JUSTICE 253, 256 (Norman Daniels ed., 
1989) (noting that, historically, the wealthy have generally had more political influence than 
the poor); RAWLS, supra note 34, at 44 (“[A] free market system must be set within a 
framework of political and legal institutions that adjust the long-run trend of economic 
forces so as to prevent excessive concentrations of property and wealth, especially those 
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Consider more social goods.  Suppose the haves and the have-nots 
compete for various awards based on their performance in certain activities, 
such as athletics or the arts.  Or suppose they compete for the opportunity 
to serve in various leadership positions in social organizations.  Once again, 
the financially better-off and the financially worse-off might have the same 
innate abilities and be similarly motivated to obtain these social goods.  But 
the better-off would be in a position to afford better training and other 
resources necessary to compete for these goods at a higher level.  
Consequently, the haves would enjoy an advantage over the have-nots in 
obtaining the kinds of social goods that can be a strong source of self-
respect and esteem.162
The numerous ways that income inequality within a society can 
undermine an ideal of equality of opportunity might provide a justification 
for a pay ratio disclosure rule.  Principally, this is because the pay gaps 
between a company’s workers are one source of wealth inequalities within 
a society.  A pay ratio disclosure rule might provide socially responsible 
stakeholders with information about how much, if at all, a company’s pay 
schedule is undermining an ideal of equality of opportunity in society.  In 
response to such information, stakeholders, such as investors, regulators, 
employees, and consumers, might rationally take steps to encourage a 
company to revise its pay schedule to respect better this egalitarian ideal. 
Assuming an ideal of equality of opportunity provides one 
justification for a pay ratio disclosure rule, we can see that this ideal also 
favors a max-min rule over a max-median rule, such as Section 953(b).  
Ultimately, the rationale behind a demand on institutions to promote an 
ideal of equality of opportunity can be thought of as grounded in 
considerations of fairness.163  Under this egalitarian ideal, it is unfair if 
some have worse prospects for success than others.  And as suggested 
earlier, other things being equal, treating someone unfairly seems worse, 
the worse off the person is.164  So the worse off someone is, the stronger her 
moral objection to being treated unfairly.  Hence, other things being equal, 
the worst-off have the most urgent claim against unfair treatment.  The 
claims to fair treatment of the worst-off should take priority over the claims 
of those who are better off. 
In a company, the least-paid worker is likely the worst-off member of 
likely to lead to political domination.”). 
 162.  See supra text accompanying note 158 (discussing the value of self-respect). 
 163.  See RAWLS, supra note 34, 42-44 (proposing a principle of fair equality of 
opportunity as part of a theory of “justice as fairness”); Scanlon, supra note 30, at 44, 46 
(describing various reasons for pursuing greater equality).
 164.  See supra text accompanying notes 147-148 (proposing a prioritarian conception 
for assessing the strength of the fairness claims of individuals). 
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the firm.  So the least-paid worker likely has the strongest moral objection 
to having lower prospects of success than others.  Higher-paid employees 
in the company, including the median worker, might also have worse 
opportunities for success than those even better off, and their lack of 
equality of opportunity might also be unfair.  Thus, higher-paid workers in 
a company can have a claim to more income as a means to improving their 
prospects of success, providing them with a more equal opportunity for 
success compared to those even better off.  But that said, the lowest-paid 
worker in the company is still likely to have the most urgent claim to more 
income as a means of obtaining a more equal opportunity for success.  So 
presumably, the claim of the lowest-paid worker should take priority over 
the claims of higher-paid workers. 
To elaborate, consider again the sorts of economic, political, and 
social goods that could be covered under an ideal of equality of 
opportunity.  The least-paid worker in a company is likely to fare the worst 
with respect to each sort of good.  The least-paid is likely to have (a) the 
worst bundle of economic resources, such as overall wealth, (b) the lowest 
influence on her government, and (c) the least esteem from others along 
with the weakest sense of self-respect.165  Furthermore, the least-paid 
employee is likely to have the worst prospects for improving her lot of 
these goods.  Consequently, the least-paid employee is likely to be the 
worst-off member of a company all things considered.  So the least-paid 
worker is likely to have the most urgent claim to more income as a means 
to providing her with a better, more equal opportunity of obtaining the 
relevant goods. 
Given that the claim to more equality of opportunity of a company’s 
lowest-paid worker should take priority over the claim of the higher-paid 
median worker, there are two reasons why a max-min pay ratio disclosure 
rule would be preferable to a max-median rule.  First, as we have 
mentioned, under a max-median rule, a company would have a perverse 
incentive to transfer income from its lowest-paid employees to its higher-
paid median employee.  By doing so, the company would improve the 
prospects for success of the median worker, but only at the unacceptable 
expense of lowering the prospects for workers who are worse off.  As a 
result of such regressive transfers of pay, the overall fairness in the 
distribution of opportunities across all the company’s workers would 
presumably decrease. 
Conversely, a max-min rule would provide a company with the right 
incentive to make only progressive transfers of income from higher-paid to 
lower-paid employees.  Such progressive transfers could lower the chances 
 165.  See supra text accompanying note 159. 
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for success of those who are paid higher.  But any losses in fairness to the 
higher-paid would presumably be outweighed by the gains in fairness to the 
worst-off as a result of improving their prospects for success.  Thus, the 
overall fairness in the distribution of opportunities across all workers in a 
company would more likely improve under a max-min pay ratio disclosure 
rule.  In essence, a max-min rule would provide a company with the right 
incentive to make only progressive transfers of pay among its employees 
that would better promote overall the ideal of equality of opportunity.  
Under a max-median rule, a company would have a perverse incentive to 
make regressive transfers of pay that would overall impair this egalitarian 
ideal.
Second, relative to a max-median pay ratio disclosure rule, a max-min 
rule would provide socially responsible stakeholders with more important 
information about how well a company is promoting an ideal of equality of 
opportunity.  It might be unfair if the median worker of a company has 
worse prospects for success than more highly-paid workers in the company.  
So stakeholders do have reason to value any egalitarian information 
conveyed under a max-median rule.  However, because the claim to 
equality of opportunity of the least-paid is more urgent than the claim of 
the median employee, stakeholders have even more reason to care about 
how the least-paid employee fares in terms of prospects for success.  So 
stakeholders have more reason to care about the egalitarian information 
conveyed under a max-min rule.  Other things being equal, a moral ideal of 
equality of opportunity entails that reducing the pay gap between the 
highest- and lowest-paid employees in a company should take priority over 
reducing the gap between the highest-paid employee and the median 
employee. 
D. Positive Desert 
Another potential objection to pay gaps between a company’s workers 
could be grounded in considerations of “positive desert.”166  The concept of 
positive desert is contestable.167  Reasonable individuals can hold different 
conceptions of what positive desert means, and they might apply the 
concept differently to various situations.  Nevertheless, we can still outline 
some potentially salient aspects of the concept that at least some 
individuals might reasonably accept.  At a basic level, a claim of positive 
 166.  J. L. A. Garcia, Two Concepts of Desert, 5 LAW. & PHIL. 219, 219-24 (1986) 
(distinguishing a sense of “positive desert” from a sense of “negative desert”). 
 167.  Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in 
Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299, 317 (1992) (discussing “the tension 
between philosophical liberalism and ordinary notions of desert”). 
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desert is a claim that an individual deserves certain benefits in response to 
something about the person, such as what the person is like or has done.168
Here we can distinguish between two different conceptions of what it 
means for someone to deserve a benefit. 
In a weaker sense, claims of positive desert could be claims of mere 
value.  In this sense, a claim that someone deserves a benefit entails that it 
would be intrinsically good that she receives the benefit.169  More 
specifically, assume there is some optimal amount of a benefit that 
someone deserves.  Then it would be good in itself that the person receives 
this optimal amount of the benefit.170  So to the extent that the person 
receives the benefit up to the optimal amount, it would be intrinsically 
good.171  To the extent she receives any less than the optimal amount, it 
would be intrinsically bad.172  More controversially, proponents of positive 
desert might further contend that it would be bad in itself if a person were 
to receive more of a benefit than she deserves.173  Thus, to the extent 
someone receives any more of a benefit than she deserves, that could also 
be intrinsically bad.174
In a stronger sense, claims of positive desert could be claims of 
justice.  In this sense, a claim that someone deserves a benefit entails that 
he has a right to the benefit.175  More specifically, suppose again that a 
person deserves some optimal amount of a benefit.  Then the person has a 
right to this amount.  To the extent he receives any less than the optimal 
amount, that would be a violation of his rights.  That would be an injustice.  
 168.  See Garcia, supra note 166, at 219-20 (making the distinction between “positive 
desert” and “negative desert”).  The relevant sense of positive desert here is “pre-
institutional.”  Thomas M. Scanlon, Giving Desert Its Due, 16 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 101, 
102 (2013) (explaining how conceiving of desert in a “pre-institutional” sense allows us to 
understand the extent to which institutions are just).  In a pre-institutional sense, what a 
person deserves can be assessed independently of how particular institutions, including 
companies, are legally required or permitted to treat him.  In this pre-institutional sense, 
considerations of desert can serve as an independent basis for assessing the justification of 
how institutions are legally required or permitted to treat someone.  
 169.  Cf. Shelly Kagan, Equality and Desert, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?: A READER ON
JUSTICE AND DESERT 298, 298-301 (Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod eds., 1999) 
(discussing how considerations of desert could affect the goodness of an outcome). 
 170.  See id. at 300-01 (suggesting that all individuals have an optimal desert level, 
which, when reached, means they are receiving all that they deserve; arguing that when 
individuals have more or less than they deserve, then this is bad from the perspective of 
desert).
 171.  Id.
 172.  Id.
 173.  Id.
 174.  Id.
 175.  See Garcia, supra note 166, at 222-24 (explaining that denying someone what they 
deserve is unjust and defining justice in terms of respecting the rights of others).  
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Moreover, the gravity of the injustice would be proportional to how much 
the individual falls short of receiving all of the benefit that he deserves. 
Whether claims of positive desert are weaker claims of value or 
stronger claims of justice, there is a sense in which the concept of positive 
desert can be thought of as a non-comparative moral notion.176  In this 
sense, the positive desert of an individual does not essentially depend on 
the positive desert of any other individual.  So how much someone 
deserves of a particular kind of benefit does not essentially depend on how 
much anyone else deserves of the same benefit or any other good for that 
matter. 
In another sense, though, judgments of positive desert might involve a 
comparative element.  We can ask how much more deserving of a 
particular benefit one person is than another person.  Two individuals can 
be equally deserving of a particular good.  Alternatively, one person can 
deserve more or less of a good than another person. 
Some might further contend that there is special value in distributing 
goods in proportion to how much individuals deserve those goods relative 
to other individuals.177  For example, suppose one person is twice as 
deserving as another person.  That is, the one person deserves twice as 
much of a particular benefit as the other person deserves.  Then the one 
individual should receive twice as much of the good as the other person.  In 
short, the good should be distributed in proportion to the relative desert of 
the individuals who stand to receive it. 
Given our outline of some potentially important aspects of the concept 
of positive desert, we can ask what might qualify as a positive desert 
basis.178  Some might contend that labor itself could be a basis for positive 
desert.179  Engaging in work could make one deserving of certain benefits.  
Now the question is:  what properties of labor determine the proportionality 
of positive desert?  In other words, what aspects of someone’s labor 
determine how much she deserves for her labor? 
 176.  See Kagan, supra note 169, at 301 (noting the non-comparative nature of 
determining how deserving an individual is). See generally Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative
Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 298 (1974) (discussing the distinction between “comparative and 
noncomparative justice”). 
 177.  Cf. Kagan, supra note 169, 301-02 (endorsing a notion of “essentially comparative 
desert”).
 178.  See Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 56-61 (1970) (discussing the 
concept of “desert bases”). 
 179.  See, e.g., Owen McLeod, Desert and Wages, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE?: A
READER ON JUSTICE AND DESERT 271, 271-72 (Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod eds., 
1999) (noting that the performance of “contracted work” can make one deserving of a 
wage). 
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How much a worker deserves could be a complex function of a wide 
range of characteristics about her job.180  To illustrate, consider three 
potential factors:  effort, difficulty, and contribution.  Regarding effort, 
some might contend that the more effort, whether physical or intellectual, 
required to perform a job, the more someone deserves for performing the 
job.181  Regarding difficulty, we might say that the more stressful, 
unpleasant, or dangerous the work is, the more deserving the work is of the 
relevant benefits.182  Regarding contribution, a worker might deserve more 
or less depending on the value of what she produces.183  For example, the 
more valuable a worker’s services or the products that she produces, the 
more deserving she could be on the basis of her labor.  In the context of a 
company, the value of an employee’s work might be thought of as the 
marginal contribution that the employee makes to the overall value of the 
firm.184  The more value that the employee adds to her company, the more 
deserving she might be of the relevant benefits. 
Now the question is:  what are the relevant benefits that workers could 
deserve on the basis of their labor? In the least demanding sense, what 
workers deserve for their labor might be certain positive attitudes from 
others and perhaps a fitting expression of those attitudes.185  For example, 
workers could deserve gratitude from the beneficiaries of their labor.186  Or 
laborers could deserve esteem from others for work that was 
extraordinarily challenging or valuable in some way. 
In a more demanding sense, workers might deserve to receive certain 
material resources for their labor.  Most importantly, these material 
 180.  See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 6, at 262 (summarizing a wide range of factors that 
might affect how much pay a worker could deserve for performing her job); McLeod, supra
note 179, at 272-80 (same). 
 181.  See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 6, at 262 (highlighting physical effort as a measure 
for the deservingness of pay); McLeod, supra note 179, at 272-73 (same). 
 182.  See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 6, at 262 (proposing stress, unpleasantness, and 
dangerousness as factors for pay desert determination); McLeod, supra note 179, at 275-77 
(same).
 183.  See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 6, at 262 (proposing the value added by the worker 
to the firm as a factor for pay desert determination); McLeod, supra note 179, at 273-75 
(same).
 184.  Cf. JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES,
INTERESTS AND PROFITS (1956) (developing a marginal productivity theory of income 
distribution). 
 185.  See Feinberg, supra note 178, at 82 (“[R]esponsive attitudes are the basic things 
persons deserve and that ‘modes of treatment’ are deserved only in a derivative way” as a 
“means of expressing the morally fitting attitudes”). 
 186.  Some might contend, though, that the beneficiaries of someone’s labor would be 
warranted in feeling gratitude toward the worker only if the worker was motivated to engage 
in the labor from a benevolent concern for the interests of the beneficiaries.  Scanlon, supra
note 168, at 114. 
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resources could include money or other forms of monetary compensation, 
such as shares of company stock.187  Thus, an employee of a company 
might deserve to receive a certain amount of income from the company on 
the basis of her work for the company.  In this sense, an employee’s 
income from a company could be deserved or undeserved. 
Now there might be two general ways to evaluate a company’s pay 
schedule on the basis of positive desert.  In a non-comparative sense, we 
can ask whether each employee of the company is paid what the employee 
deserves solely on the basis of the employee’s own labor.  To the extent a 
company pays its employees what they deserve, its pay schedule is good.  
To the extent employees receive less income than they deserve, the pay 
schedule is deficient.  More controversially, perhaps a company’s pay 
schedule is objectionable on grounds of positive desert insofar as the 
company pays its workers more than they deserve based on their labor. 
In a comparative sense, we can ask how much income each employee 
in a company deserves relative to other employees in the company.  We 
can then determine the extent to which the company pays its employees in 
proportion to their relative desert.  Suppose one employee deserves twice 
as much income as a co-worker.  Perhaps the employee works twice as 
hard as her co-worker, or maybe the employee performs work that is twice 
as valuable to the company as the co-worker’s labor.  Then to the extent 
that the company pays the employee twice as much as her co-worker, the 
company’s pay schedule is good from a comparative perspective of 
positive desert.  To the extent the employee is paid more or less than twice 
the compensation of her co-worker, the pay schedule is deficient.  In short, 
the company’s pay schedule should reflect how deserving each employee 
in the company is in relation to other employees in the company. 
The various ways of evaluating a company’s pay schedule based on 
positive desert could provide reasons to object to a pay gap between a 
company’s employees.  In a company, suppose some workers receive less 
income than others.  There are at least three reasons why this pay gap could 
be objectionable on the basis of positive desert.  First, the lower-paid 
workers might be receiving less (or more) pay than they deserve from the 
company.  Second, the higher-paid employees might be receiving more (or 
less) pay than they deserve.  Third, the difference in pay between the 
higher-paid and lower-paid workers might be out of proportion to their 
relative desert.  For example, even if the higher-paid employees deserve 
more income than their lower-paid co-workers, the difference in income 
between them might exceed the degree to which the higher-paid are more 
 187.  See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 178, at 88-94 (describing various forms of 
remuneration that employees might deserve for their services). 
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deserving than the lower-paid.188
The ways in which pay differences between employees could be 
objectionable on the basis of positive desert can provide another 
justification for requiring companies to comply with a pay ratio disclosure 
rule.  The pay ratio disclosed could provide socially responsible 
stakeholders with a source of information about the extent to which a 
company is paying its workers less or more than they deserve.  The pay 
ratio could also indicate the extent to which the company is compensating 
its employees in proportion or out of proportion to their relative desert.  
Socially conscious stakeholders might use such information in assessing 
the need for the company to adjust its pay schedule to respect better the 
moral ideal of paying its workers in proportion to what they deserve. 
In light of the case for a pay ratio disclosure rule on the basis of 
positive desert, we can see that this justification also favors the adoption of 
a max-min rule over a max-median rule, such as Section 953(b), for two 
reasons.  First, the least-paid employee in a company is likely more 
vulnerable than the median employee to receiving less pay than she 
deserves.  The least-paid worker likely has less bargaining power over pay 
negotiations.  The value of the work of the least-paid employee in a 
company is also less likely to be fully appreciated than the work of higher-
paid employees.189  For the value of the work of the least-paid is likely less 
salient to the company than the value of the work of the higher-paid.190  In 
large part, the value of the essential work that the least-paid employees do 
for a company consists in freeing up higher-paid employees to perform 
other sorts of work for the company that receive more attention, such as 
work requiring more creativity or technical skills.191  A max-min rule is 
preferable to a max-median rule because it provides information about the 
compensation of the least-paid worker whose pay warrants greater scrutiny, 
on grounds of positive desert, than the pay of the median worker.192
 188.  See Moriarty, supra note 6, at 263-67 (arguing that the actual difference in pay 
between CEOs and lower-paid employees has been too high under any desert justification). 
 189.  Cf. Anderson, supra note 30, at 326 (arguing that, in a system of democratic 
equality, low-wage workers would be appreciated for freeing up others to make more 
productive uses of their talents). 
 190.  Cf. id. (noting how work from the least-paid frees up time for higher-paid 
employees).
 191.  See id. (same). 
 192.  To clarify, I do not suggest that very low levels of annual compensation are never 
deserved for certain sorts of workers.  For example, it is possible that the least-paid 
employee in a company works on a very limited part-time basis, naturally making the 
employee deserving of a low level of annual compensation from the company.  Under any 
sensible max-min pay ratio disclosure rule, this company would be free to disclose a 
narrative discussion of why the annual compensation of its least-paid employee is deserved.  
The company would also be free to disclose supplementary information about the pay of any 
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Second, proponents of positive desert might contend that the worse-
off should receive priority over the better-off in receiving the benefits that 
they deserve.  Other things being equal, it is more imperative that the 
worse-off receive their deserved benefits than the better-off.193  Assuming 
the least-paid employee in a company is the worst-off member of the firm, 
that employee has the most urgent claim to receiving all the pay that he 
deserves.  As we have noted, though, under a max-median rule, a company 
intent on reducing the disclosed pay ratio would have a perverse incentive 
to transfer income from its lower-paid employees to its higher-paid median 
employee.  In doing so, the company would presumably redistribute 
income from those with a stronger claim to receiving their deserved pay to 
someone with a weaker claim.  Under a max-min rule, a company would 
have no such perverse incentive.  To minimize the pay ratio disclosed 
under a max-min rule, a company has an incentive to adjust its pay 
schedule in a way that gives priority to benefiting its least-paid worker who 
presumably has the most urgent claim to receiving all the pay that he 
deserves. 
E. Shame
1. An Argument 
Another possible reason to object to income inequalities within a 
company focuses on the negative feelings that such inequalities could 
engender among the lower-paid employees of the firm.194  When workers in 
a company realize that they are paid less than other workers in the firm, 
they might regard their lower pay as a signal that their employer values 
them or their work less.  In response, lower-paid workers may experience 
feelings of inferiority to their higher-paid co-workers. 
These feelings of inferiority can be, in essence, feelings of shame.195
And shame can be detrimental to one’s well-being in a number of ways, 
eroding the experiential quality of one’s life and impeding one’s motivation 
to engage in public activities.196  The intensity of shame that lower-paid 
employees might experience could correlate with the magnitude of the pay 
other employees, such as its least-paid full-time employee. 
 193.  Here I propose a prioritarian conception of how to assess the strength of the 
positive desert claims of individuals. 
 194.  See Scanlon, supra note 30, at 43 (arguing that inequalities can produce negative 
feelings within those treated as inferior). 
 195.  See id.
 196.  See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 72, at 183 (“[S]hame involves the realization that 
one is weak and inadequate in some way in which one expects oneself to be adequate.  Its 
reflex is to hide from the eyes of those who will see one’s deficiency.”) (footnote omitted). 
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gap between them and their higher-paid co-workers.  The greater the 
difference in pay between two workers, the more shame that the lower-paid 
may experience in response to the pay gap.  A larger pay gap could elicit 
stronger feelings of inferiority. 
The negative feelings that income inequalities within a company could 
generate might provide another more specific justification for a pay ratio 
disclosure rule.197  The pay ratio disclosed could indicate the extent to 
which a company’s pay schedule results in feelings of inferiority among its 
employees.  Socially responsible stakeholders may then use this 
information to encourage companies to ameliorate any feelings of shame 
felt by lower-paid employees. 
Obviously, to mitigate such feelings of shame, a company could 
simply flatten its pay schedule, reducing the differences in pay between its 
workers.  But there could be other ways to reduce the intensity of such 
negative feelings.  For example, a company might provide its lower-paid 
employees with special opportunities to earn various non-pecuniary forms 
of recognition or rewards.  Although the selective grant of non-pecuniary 
awards could potentially create other objectionable forms of inequality 
among a company’s workforce, the use of such awards might still have the 
virtue of offsetting some of the shame that some employees feel from being 
paid less than others.198
Given the case for a pay ratio disclosure rule as a source of 
information about potential feelings of shame resulting from a company’s 
pay schedule, it is apparent that this justification also favors the adoption of 
a max-min rule over a max-median rule for two reasons.  First, the lowest-
paid employee of a company likely stands to experience the worst shame 
from the pay disparities within the company.  The least-paid is paid less 
than every other employee in the company, and the largest pay differences 
within the company will involve the lowest-paid worker.  Relative to the 
feelings of the median employee, who is paid at least as much as half the 
company’s workforce, the lowest-paid employee of the company will likely 
feel inferior to a wider range of workers, and his feelings of inferiority are 
likely to be more intense.  A max-min pay ratio disclosure rule is preferable 
to a max-median rule because a max-min rule sensibly focuses attention on 
the class of workers who stand to suffer the worst feelings of shame from 
 197.  Negative feelings of shame certainly harm someone’s welfare, which we discussed 
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 69-95.  The egalitarian character of such 
feelings, though, warrants discussing them as a separate justification for a pay ratio 
disclosure rule. Cf. Scanlon, supra note 30, at 43 (noting that individuals who are worse off 
than others in material terms can experience feelings of inferiority and shame). 
 198.  Cf. Scanlon, supra note 30, at 55-56 (describing a strategy of “diversification” for 
mitigating the negative feelings of inferiority and shame that some persons might experience 
in response to some inequalities). 
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inequalities within a company’s pay schedule. 
Second, the lowest-paid workers in a company are likely the worst-off 
members of the company overall, in part because they stand to experience 
the worst feelings of shame from the income inequalities within the 
company.  Hence, the least-paid employees likely have the most urgent 
claim to reducing the pay gaps that generate their feelings of inferiority.  
As noted previously, though, under a max-median rule, a company intent 
on decreasing the disclosed pay ratio would have a perverse incentive to 
transfer pay from its lowest-paid workers to its higher-paid median worker.  
Such a regressive transfer of income would risk intensifying the worst 
feelings of shame that any of the company’s employees stand to 
experience, harming the class of employees who have the strongest claim 
to benefits that would ameliorate their feelings of inferiority.  Under a max-
min rule, a company would not have this perverse incentive to make 
regressive transfers of income.  A max-min rule would provide a company 
with the right incentive to adjust its pay schedule in a way that minimizes 
the worst feelings of shame that its worst-off employees stand to 
experience from pay disparities. 
2. Three Drawbacks 
In light of the justifications for a pay ratio disclosure rule that we have 
canvassed, it is important to note three potential drawbacks of such a rule 
on the feelings of shame experienced by at least some lower-paid workers.  
There are at least three possible ways in which a pay ratio disclosure rule, 
whether a max-min rule or a max-median rule, could have the unintended 
consequence of actually increasing feelings of inferiority among some 
lower-paid employees of a company.199
First, absent a pay ratio disclosure rule, some lower-paid employees in 
a company might be unaware of how much they make relative to other 
employees in the company.  In particular, some might be unaware of how 
close they are to being the least-paid in the company, and some might be 
unaware of how much they are paid below or above the median of the 
annual compensation of all the company’s workers.  Without this 
comparative information, these lower-paid employees could be spared 
 199.  A fourth possible way would be the disclosure of the personal identity of the lower-
paid employees whose compensation is revealed under the terms of a pay ratio disclosure 
rule.  However, any sensible rule would require the relevant pay ratio disclosures to be de-
identified, scrubbed of any uniquely identifying personal information.  For such a 
requirement under the SEC’s final implementation of Section 953(b), see 17 C.F.R. § 
229.402(u) Instruction 11 to Item 402(u) (2016) (addressing employees’ personally 
identifiable information).  
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some feelings of shame.  A pay ratio disclosure rule could provide these 
employees with the very information about pay disparities that would cause 
them to feel inferior to higher-paid co-workers. 
Second, ideally a worker’s sense of self-respect should not depend on 
the size of his salary considered by itself or in relation to the salary of 
others.200  Instead, a person’s sense of self-respect should depend on the 
extent to which the person realizes properties of greater moral significance, 
such as the development of a morally virtuous character.201  However, by 
requiring a company to disclose publically a ratio of pay between its 
employees, a pay ratio disclosure rule could have the unfortunate effect of 
“dramatizing the value” of relative pay, leading some workers to form the 
false impression that their pay relative to others is of greater significance to 
their self-worth than it really is.202  So in response to a pay ratio disclosure 
rule, some lower-paid employees might unfortunately experience greater 
feelings of inferiority to their higher-paid co-workers because they might 
be misled to attach more personal significance to the pay differences 
between them and their higher paid co-workers. 
Third, it is possible that employees in a company do care, at least to 
some degree, about how much they are paid relative to every other 
employee in the company.  But in the standard case, workers will place 
most weight on how they fare relative to other workers in a perceived peer 
group.203  Arguably, the perceived peer group would include only workers 
who hold positions that are in some sense similar.  Presumably, though, a 
pay ratio disclosure rule, including either a max-min rule or a max-median 
rule, would require the disclosure of a pay comparison between employees 
who are not in the same peer group, who hold very different positions 
within a company. 
In reaction to a pay ratio disclosure rule, some lower-paid workers 
might unfortunately form the false impression that they should either 
expand the boundaries of their perceived peer group or attach greater 
personal significance to how much they are paid relative to workers outside 
their peer group.  By caring more about their pay relative to a wider range 
of employees, these lower-paid workers could also be led to experience 
worse feelings of shame and inferiority due to a pay ratio disclosure rule. 
 200.  See Frankfurt, supra note 84, at 23 (“The doctrine of [economic] equality 
contributes to the moral disorientation and shallowness of our time.”). 
 201.  See Scanlon, supra note 30, at 55 (suggesting “good moral character, 
conscientiousness as a citizen, and devotion to the well-being of one’s family and friends” 
as more important “indices of self-worth”). 
 202.  See Scanlon, supra note 30, at 54. 
 203.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND 
THE QUEST FOR STATUS 30-34 (1985) (discussing the importance to individuals of “reference 
groups” when making interpersonal comparisons of status). 
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Given the possibility of these negative externalities on the feelings of 
some lower-paid employees, a company has even more reason under a pay 
ratio disclosure rule to be vigilant about taking steps to mitigate any 
feelings of shame or inferiority felt among its workers in response to 
inequalities within the company’s pay schedule. 
CONCLUSION
Two Possible Amendments to Section 953(b) 
When Congress passed Section 953(b) as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
the legislative history did not contain any rationale behind this pay ratio 
disclosure rule.204  Commentators on Section 953(b) also expressed 
uncertainty and skepticism about the justification of the provision.205  In 
this article, I have shown that several egalitarian reasons provide significant 
support for adopting some sort of pay ratio disclosure rule.  A subset of 
these reasons follows from a theory of intrinsic egalitarianism, which 
assumes that inequalities can be bad in themselves.  Other reasons follow 
from a theory of instrumental egalitarianism, which focuses on the potential 
bad effects of income inequalities. 
Although all the egalitarian reasons we have canvassed count in favor 
of adopting some kind of pay ratio disclosure rule, none entails that Section 
953(b) is the optimal form of such a rule.  Section 953(b) is an example of 
a max-median pay ratio disclosure rule, and all the relevant egalitarian 
reasons favor the adoption of a max-min rule over a max-median rule.  As a 
consequence, Section 953(b) stands in need of revision.  Congress should 
amend Section 953(b) accordingly, converting it to a max-min rule. 
Two possible amendments are particularly worth considering.  First, 
Congress could revise Section 953(b) to require a company to disclose only 
(a) the compensation of its CEO, (b) the compensation of its lowest-paid 
employee, and (c) the ratio of the two.  Alternatively, Congress might 
simply add to the current version of Section 953(b) a further requirement 
on a company to disclose information about the compensation of its least-
paid employee.  Under the terms of this latter amendment, a company 
would be required to disclose three ratios.  More precisely, a company 
would be required to disclose (a) the compensation of its CEO, (b) the 
compensation of its median employee, (c) the compensation of its lowest-
paid employee, (d) the ratio of the CEO’s pay to the pay of the median 
employee, (e) the ratio of the CEO’s pay to the pay of the lowest-paid 
 204.  See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 205.  See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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employee, and (f) the ratio of the median employee’s pay to the pay of the 
least-paid employee.  I leave it an open question which of these two 
possible amendments would be better, all things considered.206
A Positive Externality 
To close, I mention one more potential benefit of adopting a max-min 
pay ratio disclosure rule, which could take the form of either amendment to 
Section 953(b) just discussed.  In a number of jurisdictions across the U.S., 
there is an ongoing policy debate over whether to pass new laws raising the 
minimum wage.207  Proponents of higher minimum wage laws are 
motivated to improve the life prospects of the worst-off employees in 
companies.208  Opponents worry about the potentially negative effects of 
the additional labor costs required to raise the minimum wage.209
A max-median pay ratio disclosure rule, such as Section 953(b) in its 
current unrevised form, makes the need for higher minimum wage laws 
even more pressing.  As we have noted, under a max-median rule, a 
company would have a perverse incentive to make regressive transfers of 
income, redistributing pay from its lower-paid workers to its higher-paid 
median worker.  Such regressive transfers could decrease the pay of the 
least-paid employees of a company.  Thus, under a max-median rule, a 
company could be led to reduce its concern for the lot of its worst-off 
employees, focusing instead on the lot of its median employee.  Higher 
minimum wage laws might be needed to protect a company’s worst-off 
workers from the harmful effects of the perverse incentives provided to 
companies by a max-median rule. 
A max-min pay ratio disclosure rule should have the opposite effect.  
A max-min rule would make the need for higher minimum wage laws less 
 206.  Relative to the first amendment, the second would have the benefit of disclosing 
more information about the inequality within a company’s pay schedule.  However, the 
compliance costs of the second amendment would also be higher than those of the first.  
Whether these additional compliance costs would be justified by the value of the additional 
information disclosed under the second amendment is, again, a question I leave open for 
further analysis. 
 207.  See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Push to Lift Minimum Wage is Now Serious Business,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/nyregion/push-to-lift-
hourly-pay-is-now-serious-business.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/KA76-4DKV] 
(commenting on calls to raise the minimum wage level to fifteen dollars per hour and 
differing opinions on such an action). 
 208.  See, e.g., id. (“Labor leaders argue that large increases are needed at the bottom of 
the pay scale to lift workers out of poverty . . . .”). 
 209.  See, e.g., id. (“The movement to make $15 the floor for hourly wages . . . has 
infuriated companies large and small, which say it compels hard choices between raising 
prices and firing workers.”). 
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urgent.  Under a max-min rule, a company would have the right incentive 
to give priority to increasing the compensation of its lowest-paid 
employees over its higher-paid employees.  To minimize the pay ratio 
disclosed under a max-min rule, a company has an incentive to maximize 
the pay of its lowest-paid employee.  Consequently, a max-min rule would 
have the virtue of encouraging companies to increase the compensation of 
their least-paid employees without forcing companies to do so through 
additional regulation.210  This positive externality of a max-min pay ratio 
disclosure rule should be a welcome effect to both proponents and 
opponents of higher minimum wage laws. 
 210.  In this sense, a max-min pay ratio disclosure rule could be thought of as “nudging” 
companies to increase the minimum pay for their employees.  See RICHARD H. THALER &
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
6 (2008) (defining a “nudge” as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives”).
